Saturday, August 3, 2013

TEA LEAVES, GOAT ENTRAILS OR F4F IT

The Eighth US Air Force suffered the greatest casualty in its day light precision bombing campaign over Germany suffered a higher casualty rate than the US Army Ground Forces, and higher than the Japanese Kamikaze campaign.  Post War bombing surveys of these efforts, particularly “carpet bombing” reported that it had marginal effects on war production.   The objective of strategic bombing was to kill and destroy enough people and materiel to persuade the enemy leadership to surrender.  Each new campaign was predicated on some estimate that the destruction of this target or that would bring Hitler to the bargaining table.   He died in his bunker while Soviet Troops pillaged Berlin.
STRATEGIC BOMBING AND FEEDING THE DEEATED

The B-29 high altitude bombing of Japan had marginal effect on Japanese production, so General LeMay switched to low altitude incendiary bombing of the homes of “war workers” (women, kids, old people) to bring the Japanese people to demand a surrender.   It did influence Emperor Hirohito to stage a palace coup and using his status as God-Emperor announced Japan’s surrender.  Japanese Emperors reigned but did not rule. The Army was prepared to fight to the last civilian. But no one argues with a God.
BEFORE THE SLAUGHTER WOULD HAVE LANDED, THE EMPEROR SEIZED POWER

President Francisco Solano Lopes of Paraguay (1862-1860) in the War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) cost the loss of over half the population of Paraguay. He died when the last of his army tried to disarm him. In the meantime, he had executed any potential internal threat.  Later in a new war over drilling rights called the Grand Chaco War (1932-1935) a highly German trained Bolivian Army failed to crush Paraguay.   Paraguay is very egalitarian, so much so that government is more mirage than reality, but don’t mess with Paraguay, their culture is rough and ready.


Then there was Shock and Awe. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was one shock that did not awe, but angered the US population to switch from Isolationism to vengeance and war. Now, instead of indiscriminate bombing that killed civilians, we are now engaged in “Counter Terror” targeted assassinations that kill innocent civilians in hopes that the families and neighbors of our mistakes will rise up and in sweep away the Terrorist.   

Unlike the Phoenix Program in Vietnam where the Phoenix agent lived in the villages and districts where VC threat was mines, booby traps, targeted assassinations and incoming.  That program pulled the VC infrastructure out by the roots, to be replaced by NVA dignitaries after NVA tanks took the Presidential Palace.


Therefore, it seems obvious that the irrational rationale behind killing civilians or strategic nodules, might do better with tea leaves, sheep entrails, or 52 Pickup.   We are guessing intentions with a dogma that does not deal in intentions, that is added after the “correlation of forces” or the “design” mush.  Perhaps it is time to develop a GI proofed arm and hand signal based analytical tool to factor in intentions and motive.  I call it F4F.

F4F is a catalyst that interacts with the mission and the culture(s) of those involved in a combat operation and provides appropriate questions to ask, and answers to be factored along with METT-TCulture. 

 F4F is culture centric with one assumption, that life is the center of attention.  To wit, nutrition and procreation to survive.  Also known as Feed & Breed, Dinner & Date plus consequences, those consequences known as the grandkid’s grandkids. 

F4F has four levels: Biological, Psychological, Sociological and Technological and knowing this list is not necessary: 

 Biological: 

 Feeding and breeding exists in microbes, viruses, college fraternities, and GI’s with a three day pass.

ADDAMS FAMILY VALUES

Psychological:   


There are conflicts of interest when the interests are in feeding and breeding.  The conflict for feeding is no game (dinner v diner, diners over dinner), the conflict over breeding is all game.   They psychological roles necessary to survive are to protect and nurture the young.  The strategies involved range from producing hundreds of young against the odds of making to the sea, or long periods of gestation, or in herds. In each strategy the drama of survival is simply heroes v villains, the latter be competition in feeding or breeding.   In some vertebrates the young come in eggs, in others the young can walk on day one.  In each case, the young must be aggressively protected until old enough to leave.  Don’t mess with Mother Bear when her cubs are in the danger zone.   Do not walk under trees with occupied bird’s nests or face it in the hair.
THE SOPRANO CORLEONE FAMILY

F4F divvies up the algorithm of creation into two camps, hero and villain.


Father (protector), Mother (nurturer) and Infant (grow):


Heroic:   Knight, Nurse, Infant 



PROTECT AND NURTURE -9mm

Villain:     Murderer, Manipulator, Mad.

NEED A VILLAIN? MAKE ONE UP?
The F4F Drama Triangle(s) are based on Dr Stephen Karpman’s “Drama Triangle” which is a key part of Transactional Analysis (TA) which of course applies to combat as the ultimate drama triangle.   The drama is derived from role switching between any of the six roles (Victim to Vicious, Nurse to Manipulator, etc).  

Stamp Collecting

CHARLIE BROWN COLLECTS BROWN STAMPS TO CASH IN FOR A FREE MURDER

Each role switch gives the switcher a psychological payoff called “stamps” in Transactional Analysis.  If the outcome desired by the individual or group is to be a perpetual victim, he,  she or they go through life collecting Brown stamps.   Collecting enough Brown stamps in the mind of the collector(s) is often traded in for a Red (rage), White (purity & innocent) and Black (Death).  

Sociological: 

Each cultural group, of whatever size or type has Rules that stamp collecting that is related to group survival fall into two sets of Rules (Social Status) and the physical world (Stuff). 


 Social Status: Face, Fate, Fame and Fortune.

A SUB CULTURE HAS IT'S OWN RULES AND ROLES



This is portrayed by the use of one hand above the waist pointing to the face, up in the air, a wave, and the open palm.  Fate is like source of authority as in fad, style, and/or regulations.   When Face is more important than Fate, Fame suffers. Fortune is mainly how the fortune is obtained (baker, candlestick maker)

Stuff: Time, Distance, Ground and Body.

THE HAND JIVE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE WORDS
This is portrayed with two hands below the waist:  Point at watch, two hands apart, point at ground and to belly and heart (or groin).
  
Technological:  behaviors, skills, tools, training, and equipment that facilitate a net psychological buzz (stamps) by following the Rules that enhance the desired Roles 



 A Maserati gains face, fame, for access between bodies that produce (maybe) another generation. The female selection algorithm is mysterious and inconsistent between muscle and money.

APPLIED F4F:


F4F is not a matrix, nor checklist, nor format.   It is not designed to be a grand plan in the Oval Office but is applicable to any level of command between boots and triggers to PowerPoint and coded doors. Neither is it a Gordian Knot, but a little closer to the spaghetti behind your desktop, or a ball of yarn after the cat played with it.  You take one strand at a time, and follow it and follow the yarn that are connected.

The Maserati might be a start.  First question is what Fortune fostered this glamour?  How was the money made?  What Fate allowed the aggregation of wealth?   Is the Face of the owner enhanced despite the warts? The Ground the car drives on includes roads, across bridges, to a place that takes Time to travel the Distance   


OPERATION (CLASSIFIED)

 The truck driver in (classified) has to drive from (classified) to (classified).  She wants to know the condition of the roads through (classified) to (classified).   How are the buildings in (classified) built, of what materials (beer can sheets, mud, brick, reinforced concrete). And are there alleys or are the buildings glued together like in Italy or Mexico?   The little black shapes on a 1:50,000 don’t show that, an aerial view might.
WHERE MEXICAN SILVER WAS MINED

The platoon leader In Operation” X” in (classified) wants to know the same questions in his/her area of operations and also wants to know the “Face” issues of all involved including all players that relate to the probability of stand and die, cut and run, or cut a deal.   
QL 13 THUNDER ROAD, WHERE THE RUBBER MET THE ROAD


After a while in an area, the average trooper gets a feel for this.  F4F provides a quick guide to seek out the answers which may exists already in some database or SME or Combat Farmer.  F4F adds the significance, motive, intention in the comparison of courses of action.  These considerations apply to the entire Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) or Operational Design and to all the factors of METT-TC.  This process can be fed by information already coded in ASCOPE, PMESII-PT, CIA Country Studies, or the scuttlebutt with the real skinny.


End Note.


Curses be upon whomever makes this a mandatory class, or required course, or flip chart, flash card, or MOS skill indicator. This is for people especially the reader once having read this.  A reminder: Just look at your two hands, then to your gut, and you will remember,110505



Saturday, June 22, 2013

Wealth Begets Not War Frustration Does.




In response to a Stratfor Opinion Piece on the increased sophistication of SE Asian Military Forces which asserted that Capitalism begets military expansionism as shown by the new higher tech expansion of SE Asian and Chinese weaponry.
 
Soviet Film "Battleship Potemkin after a 1905 Black Sea Mutiny

 


"I  see a new mythology under beta test here, to the end First Principle what wealth begets military might which is manifested by "high end" materiel.   This Retro-Red point of view hung up with a world view of the rise of the evil capitalist bourgeoisie is necessarily militaristic is a fairy tale to frighten College Freshmen. 


Collage of Anti-War demonstrators waving Viet Cong flag
 
 


The reverse is true, in an age of declining resources, the biggest and baddest gun gets to goodies, like low tech food, gas, ammo, housing, and girls. To  that end, poor nations are kept poor. Any attempt to un-poor them is a clear and present threat to the hoarding gunsel faction.

 



 

To break this cycle of poverty begetting guns which begets poverty, one injects fancy guns to the gunsel faction.   The important thing to note, is that guns are status symbols and the bigger the gun the better.  This upgrade in gunnery works to faciltate fatness of the starved with guns that don't work on the street.  And too expensive to be used by the rabble.

 

The "downsizing" of large primitive forces into smaller more effective and better armed with the sexy and flashy bringing fear to the neighbors, raises the social status based on high tech standoffs.  Spit and Shine Soldiers don't like to get their boots dirty, and eventually become neutered.

 

See this:


(Music by Hans Zimmer)


The Law of Inverse Attribution Reflex (L'IAR) applied to this vibrant dedication to the martial might of the Peoples Republic is bragging about their weakest virtue, the PLA.  Their strongest virtue is balancing enterprise with political stability.  The role of the PLA has been put the shadow of the growth of Communist Capitalism.

 
Gordon

 

 

Sunday, March 31, 2013

REMFCOM, FUBAR, and Failure


Few can criticize the shortfalls of a decade of blood, sweat and tears on the conduct of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and (CLASSIFIED) of the combat efficiency and effectiveness of the troops on the ground, or in the just over.  That which was accomplished was done in the face of serious efforts by REMFCOM (Pentagon) most particularly by the Mufti Cabal aka SES aka Senior Executive Service. 


Those in uniform in the Pentagon are transients as are the appointed.  The efforts to emasculate the chain of command, from flags to boots follows a clearly identifiable trail over twenty years long.  No one other than the Permanent Party (SES) has the longevity to pursue a single minded effort to neuter our armed forces in order to control the troops through personnel mismanagement or control the procurement process without regard to the directions that develop in the field.





Criticism of the actions of any establishment from someone outside that establishment either entrenches justifications for that action or does a complete 180.  This happened Immediately after the Fall of Saigon, any doctrine, hardware, or type units having justified it's existence of Stability Operations were wiped clean.




Aviation and Special Forces were able to re enter the arena after showing relevance of Fulda and of certain Caribbean adventure.




In rebuilding the Army post Vietnam which also included the Mobilization matrix that Jimmy Carter kicked off. The Congress, exercising it's specified powers over military doctrine and organization made the requirement that reserve and Guard units must have a valid combat contingency plan.   The plan created wartime alignments between specific contingencies and the units designated to carry them out.  This was known as the Capstone Alignment of units and a Capstone mission which by law and regulation all units regardless of component had to adhere to. 



Some units had more than one.  The 49th Lone Star Armor Division had a III Corps contingency mission with NORTHAG, the NATO command that covered the North German plain.  I commanded a MI Bn (CEWI type) aligned with the 49th.  All my training plans had to show a clear alignment with operations and plans of those in my Capstone mission.  The 49th also had a mission in the defense of Japan and flew to Japan to participate in the annual Yama Sakura exercise with the Japanese SDF.


The existence of the Capstone program had a downside, it cut the Flag Ranks in the administrative garrison establishment out of determining which way units were to jump.  Fifth US Army and the 90th ARCOM  then in San Antonio worked overtime to wreck the linkage between unit commander and the Capstone mission.


Desert Storm showed REMFCOM (Pentagon) that Weekend Warriors not only could fight, but often better than the Full Time amateurs, particularly in Artillery and Aviation. This was always the case since the airplane and the cannon were invented. This competence in combat posed a Clear and Present Danger to REMFCOM control of the definition of war and of promotion timing and opportunity of AC Field Grades.


In between the Iraq Wars, a group of hacks masquerading as a doctrine research element created a fake doctrine called "Transformation" which restored the Pentomic Battle Group (disbanded under JFK) but with the addition of field grade command positions that the Battle Group took away.  The "Modular" Brigades were identical with no regard to METT-Tc.  The field grades missing from the Battle Group were restored with mini-battalions, but most importantly, the two O-6 Colonel command slots that were dropped from the Pentomic division when the three brigade organization of the ROAD division was adopted.


The move to Kuwait and the invasion of Iraq was done with the ROAD MTOE, but as soon as possible  Transformation was instigated but with no notion or concept by REMFCOM (Pentagon) of logistics and fires.  The organization of fires in Continental, Union, Confederate, and Armies of the United States was top of the World Class ranking.  American logistics were the best since the Romans,  Both had to go.


Artillery is never sub optimized, fire support is centrally coordinated with the priority of fires and ammunition supply rate.  Transformation diluted firepower due to the dominance of National Guard artillery. :Likewise  logistics which formerly consisted of a task organized Combat Service Support (CSS) and Service Support predominantly from the Army Reserve were dismembered, and privatized. 


In order to camouflage the destruction of the effectiveness of the Field Army, REMFCOM deception and psychological operation directed against the US Congress, American People, the Congress, and the Total Force, "Capstone" was reset as a buzzword, back by a fabrication called "operational reserve" to replace a non-existent program called "strategic reserve"
.
.   

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

FEAR OF FOG FREEZES


Fear of Fog, Freezes Minds and Fosters
Indecision in the Face of the Fog of War

 Indecision, hesitation, and disagreement at command and staff levels ar endemic and if allowed to run unchecked leaves the battle to the bold.  The Fog of War is the default status of information of who is doing what, where, when and with what. That includes all involved, regardless of whom.  Grant and Sherman at Vicksburg, and Lee and Jackson at Chancellorsville demonstrated that rare ability described in French as coup d'oeil,  the ability to see at a glance the big picture under all the fog, smoke, and fire of battle.  All had the knack of a grasp of the whole when many of the parts were missing and some were wrong.  Of those four commanders, only one (Robert E Lee) would have been selected for higher command or the War College
Union Plan to flank Lee and march to Richmond A

Grant and Sherman were old and close friends with Grant helping Sherman recover from deep depression and despair.  Both had left the Army before the war and both had experienced failure as civilians.  Jackson was mediocre as an instructor at VMI, and not the career centric courtier that thrive with the Golden Cockroaches that infest the walls of power.  Lee was also rare, particularly today, as the perfect example of the Tidewater aristocracy that included George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.

It requires a deep understanding of the relationship between what the Soviets called the Correlation of Forces (COF), which is a broader concept than balance of power. It includes understanding the quirks of dirt, fire and maneuver and impact of the fog of war on the minds of opposing players.  The impact of the fog of war is an understanding of how a leader or manager deals with fog (missing, lost, false, and errant pieces of information.  The fog of war is also found in any decision making body absent the firepower.
Lee splits his army to hold his right and a punch to the nose with his left

The principal problem of some in positions of power is that some can't make a decision until all the pieces are accounted for, confirmed, and lead to certainty.  One British writer, Norman Dixon wrote "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" about forty years ago, and promptly forgotten and dismissed ... until now when copies of his book is expensive.  His thesis asserts that Assholes  (closest clinical term) lose battles.  More specifically, the Anal Retentive whose sense of security is secured by no shit, no messes, no confusion, orderly, clean and in accordance with regulations. 

Uncertainty in combat intelligence and operational information triggers a rigid hesitation to make decisions absent extra and comforting information that fits the templates. The correlation of shit to shot requires balls, the balls to shoot without all the shit being cleaned up. 
Lee hits Hooker with a wide left hook, while staring a force three times his size in the face

While the Anal Retentive are hesitant in uncertainty, they can be otherwise fearless, inventive, creative and inspiring leaders.  Hooker, Burnside, Fremont, and others were fearless in the face of certainty.  Grant and Sherman having lived in uncertainty and survived, knew that of ten courses of action one end certain victory and the other certain defeat, taking the first one in the middle that comes to mind and go balls to the wall wins.

Some students of the military art and the role that Assholes play in it are coming around to see the correlation in the US military between an obsession over appearance and hesitation to act, and an ever expanding need for visions of certainty: more troops, more supplies,  more intelligence, anything that provides a camouflaged pacifier.   In Afghanistan, after SOF had run the Taliban out of town, some flag rank got furious over SOF troops wearing beards, an essential status symbol in Afghanistan. 

.Indecision to the point of rash decision of the type typified by the Charge of the Light Brigade results when the indecisive mind freezes on the flight of fancy or self delusion.


Patton is an example of one who knew which shit was important and demanded a high standard of appearance and high risk when the odds favored action. It stems, so Dr Dixon says, from excessive excitement over a child's toilet training, which in the British military he traces back to excessive shit over shit in the English boarding school system.   That the diagnosis fits many cultures, the trace back to potty training doesn't hold where in both Japanese and German child raising lets the rug rats run loose, but the leash is tightened by peer pressure later.

Maps by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Monday, October 29, 2012


Failure to let the Generals Command the Commands at War.


The Generals Were Cut Out of the Action 

Gordon S Fowkes, LTC USA (RET)


Failure, by Thomas A Ricks an alleged expert on military affairs in his recent book and article in Atlantic magazine places the blame for failure in OIF and OEF squarely on the shoulders of the General (Flag rank) Officers.  By so doing, he demonstrates an abysmal awareness of what the military business and the profession at arms is all about   

In short, the generals have for well over a decade been cut out of the chain of command and key staff lines of coordination from the A-Ring to Afghanistan.  The default command and control of US military forces is depicted in Article I Section 8, clauses  10-17 of the specified powers of the Congress (raise, equip, and provide for doctrine).  Article I, Section 10,  Clauses 1 and 3 deny the States from having full time “standing troops” or ships of war in time of peace, allowing them in times of invasion or insurrection.  The Second Amendment guarantees the States right to maintain a militia subject to the doctrine provided pursuant to Congressional Guidance.


The President in Article II, Section 2, clauses 1 and two is Commander in Chief of the armed services of the US including state forces under federal control (National Guard). He has the sole right to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate, all commissioned “officers of the united states” which includes cabinet members, judges, and all military officers.  Officers make law within their jurisdiction that enforceable in US courts, which includes failure to pick up all cigarette butts if ordered to do so. Officers as such carry the authority of the sovereignty of all the states through Senate confirmation, which the same as for treaties.

During WW2 when the explosive growth of US armed forces demanded a rapid field promotion system and the authority to promote officers to flag rank (General) was delegated to the Theatre Commanders (Bradley. Ike, Mac,  Nimitz and Vandenberg)  Thus if a four star screwed up, the Theatre Commander could relieve him, two stars fell like snow. Today, all appointments to command positions for generals and admirals have to be approved by the Senate and the promotion authority for officers’ rests in the hands of service level promotion boards, and not in the field. During Vietnam, promotions to Captain were delegated to field army level.
Civil Servants and Contractors are not commissioned officers, military, diplomatic, judicial or of any  other kind.  Their future lies in the hands of contracting officials not responsible for battlefield success as are commissioned Officers.

Ricks is clearly not aware that the law that applied in WW2 is a distant memory.  The best a higher commander can do is to relieve for cause which is something not taken lightly.  Murphy’s Law is the First Law of Warfare, so screw ups and disasters go with the territory.  Real civilians can hire, fire or promote based on ankle and elbow test results.  Civil Servants work and get paid during “duty hours” forty per week plus or minus leave time.  All military personnel are on duty 24/7 with specified leaves or passes and still subject to military authority. 

There has been a movement most intense for the last twenty years to remove flag and field grade officers from the staff and command of the chain of command, and replace them with civil servants and contractors neither of whom have the carefully designed authority of  a military chain of command and staff.  US officers and non commissioned officers spend ten to twenty percent of their full time active service in residential service training an education over a twenty plus year time in service.

Contractors, Civil Service and  even the Pentagon Permanent Party (Senior Executive Service) have but a tiny fraction of the formal education of those in uniform.  In order to enhance job retention and security, the Pentagon Permanent Party, now in control of acquisitions and personnel, ensure that the uniformed passing through Pentagon do so quickly and without impact.

SecDef MacNamara was particularly incensed at the surfeit of uniforms in key command and staff positions and decided that what had worked for almost 200 years needed fixing and the Guard and Reserves were not called, and advanced mathematical models invented to humiliate those whose experience was more earthy.  Field Marshal von Rumsfeld continued the purging of flag and field ranks who had the temerity to use combat proven and tested doctrine, and invented the current system of task organization (Expeditionary Transformational Rotational Modularity).   

This tore the combat support, combat service support, and service support organizations out of the walls, floors and ceilings, outlawed the use of the names, and reallocated the functions to favorite contractors and civilian organizations, leaving the experienced flag and field ranks scurrying around to find anything that would allow them to add their professionalism to the fight. Combat commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq reported that there was little or no military sense in the allocation and management of logistics. Where it not for the fact that the Army, Navy, and Air Force Guard and Reserve units were not deployed as trained allowed enough of them to take jobs in the Contractor Mob and make good money. 

As the traditional task organization of squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade (group, regiment) division, corps, field army, army group was flushed toilet wise, and the CS, CSS. SS logistics structure pulled off the chains of command the necessary and well-rehearsed operational competence was shredded.  It is fortunate that these procedures had been ingrained in the services under the Congressionally mandated mobilization alignment in the Capstone Program to real contingency plans, the screw up factor would have made Bladensburg look like a blitzkrieg.
In short, the generals have been yanked out of effective control of line and staff, and what was left of that was put up for bid.

In order to address the sense of duty denied, there are those in the political election business who are trying to subvert those of uniform to participate or appear to participate in posing as players in partisan national politics.  


There is a substantive legal difference between service members in general and officers in particular and civil servants doing the same job, and further with contractors, even those former military personnel.  The military can be ordered into considerably more dangerous situations than civilians, and cab be tried for life for refusal or failure.  A civilian is fired for failure to perform, not imprisoned. 

The "blame" for failure of operations in OIF/OEF I do place on the contractors per se, but on the Pentagon from stripping the flag and field officers in command of maneuver troops effective command and control of their logistics.  The contractors are bound by the terms of their contracts, which were drawn up by a centralized "procurement" organization.  As such, these logistics elements cannot be prioritized or moved around by the same echelon of command that used be able to for mission requirements. 

 A Rand Study published in 2000 traces the evolution of the Army Division of the XXth Century and cautions against busting up the divisional structure before it was done on the Capture of Baghdad/


That which was sliced off the divisional Discom to form the modular support battalions of the modular brigade was done by dividing the assets equally between modular brigades, not driven by priority of fires and maneuvers. The new modular brigade (except Stryker) had two maneuver battalions instead of two to five as needed.  Two maneuver battalion is not flexible enough, and the commanders in the field had to cannibalize units and resort the assets to form additional maneuver teams.  Many field artillery battalions (fires) were re-tasked as infantry as were headquarters companies.  As of now (a decade later) the third battalion is being restored.

The original intent of the modular two-maneuver battalion modular brigade was to restore the number of O-6 (Colonel) command positions formerly in the Pentomic Infantry division of the Fifties which had five O-6 command positions for each of five "Battle Groups" which each had five rifle companies plus two for weapons, support and command.  Since there was no battalion in the mix, there was no O-5 command slot, and the only place a competent infantry Lt Col could get command time was in an Armored Division.  The Armored division did not have the Pentagonal curse. Thus Armored officers and a few lucky armored infantry officers had the requisite command time for promotion to colonel.

The Pentomic Division was replaced with the same organization as the Armored division which went on until Transformation surfaced.  The post-Vietnam task organization of combat divisions for missions removed one of the three divisional brigade command slots to put a National Guard Separate Brigade under divisional control on mobilization in place of one of the divisional brigades.  The cost the Regular Army one each O-6 command slot for each affected division.

This had to stop. The Capstone Program assigning Guard units a combat mission for existing contingencies was a clear and present danger to promotion opportunity and timing of the O-6 regular officer.  This was an integral part of planning for future missions before 9-11.

The Pentagon set about a deception plan on how they were going to restore the three lost O-6 command slots, and quietly re-tooled the Battle Group to have additional field grade staff and command slots (O-4 and O-5) by slicing up divisional combat support and combat service support assets to support the new modular brigades.  By reallocating the existing maneuver (IN/AR) battalions in pairs created five Modular Brigades restoring the three O6^ command positions.  And it reallocated combat support and combat service support staff and command positions to favor combat support officers.  This was a tactical force design intended for promotions.



The end result of slicing up the DISCOM, COSCOM, TAACOM and other TOE logistics and support organization and replacing them with ad hoc contract aggregates also removed the justification for Flag Rank command positions of those and related TOE organizations.  There were no more Area Support Groups, Transportation Groups, MP brigades, Petroleum Groups et al which made up the support structure. 

Not only were the chain of staff and command structures torn asunder, but the experience of how to do that disappears from doctrine.  All of the workings of a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) etc had been undergoing command post exercises of entire corps which included forces from all services and components but those of allied forces as well. 

All of the tables of organization, tables for allocation of resources were contained in field manuals that have been used as updated by technology, circumstance that any officer, noncom or service person could slip into any organization, and know what to do.  Now it's company policy and contract provisions.
In ten years, the experience base will start to erode to the point that years will be needed to restore. 

The stated intent of Transformation was for light, fast and agile forces, what they got was a force with maneuver limited to an extent not seen in the field since the Spanish American War. Transformation was intended to make life simple for the Pentagon to move around, but which required an extraordinary force of troops to make work.

For that reason, I stand in awe of the professional competence of our troops that made an impossible task seem simple.  The forces I served with in Germany, Japan and Vietnam would have been stopped cold with the kind of Mickey Mouse Transformation served up by Pentagon.

This is what General Dempsey knows he has to fix, but the quagmire in the Pentagon is full of mines and obstacles placed to preserve and protect lifetime employment of the Permanent Party.




Saturday, July 7, 2012

The Founding Forces



... A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended.
James Madison. June 1787
The discipline of the militia is evidently a national concern, and ought to be provided for in the national Constitution
James Madison. June 1789


There is no provision in the Constitution that guarantees the existence of a large standing professional military establishment.  The default military establishment of these United States is the "well-regulated militia" of the states (Second Amendment), when called to Federal service.  Any other military force requires Congressional action per Article 1 Section 8, Clauses 15 &16, intentionally.


1. Modest Proposal for (restoring the force)

Given human nature, a large long service standing military will do what takes to keep their jobs even if it means defeat in war, would rather play at war than win, and present a standing threat to civil authority, regardless of intent. This tendency is found in any profession, doctors who kill more patients than cure hide behind their union, lawyers who lose behind theirs. And unlike doctors and lawyers, the military doesn’t practice it’s profession so the public, the government or themselves can find out whether or not they are competent.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/modest-proposal-for-restoring-force.html

2. Sunday Punditry and the Pentagon. 

The Pentagon has a management culture and way of doing business that bears little relationship to military staff and command procedures. The military themselves are rotated in and out of the Pentagon with too short a tour to have lasting effect, likewise with most appointed officials. The real power in the Pentagon is wielded by long serving civil servants including the formidable clerical staff and the Machiavellian super-grades who maintain the continuity of policy regardless of the intent of the military and political assigned there.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/sunday-pundits-meeting-press-or-facing.html

3. Volunteers for Victory

The Neo-Con penchant for privatization of warfare inadvertently coincided with the Pentagon’s long awaited plan to disarm the threat to their market position as Warriors to the World represented by the combat experienced National Guard and Reserves. This is a natural course of action for such unions as the Teamsters, AMA, ABA and plumbers union, and the Pentagon considers the military as a closed union shop with the Guard and Reserves seasonal workers at best, fit for non union jobs such as military intelligence, psychological warfare, civil affairs, logistics, etc. Better a contractor in civilian clothes getting blown away than a uniformed citizen raising the specter that the national defense can be done at one sixth the cost.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/volunteers-for-victory.html

4. Square, Triangular, and Modular Madness

Modularization of Army divisions is a reversion to a type of organization last used in combat in the Spanish-American War which also was the last war before Desert Storm in which mobilized Guard and Reserve troops were not incorporated into the Army of the United States which was a single structure covering all components


5. A Modest Proposal for Resetting the Force

Candidates for Congressional office most lately have been presenting argument about what they would do in Iraq and Afghanistan, about staying the course or cutting and running. The

Constitution, however, gives those kinds of decisions to the President in his specified powers as in charge of foreign affairs (less trade) and as Commander in Chief.

The President, however, does not have the authority to determine what kind of military he has to command unless the Congress has given him by appropriation or law, the authority to do so.

6 Knives in Gun Fights Not a Good Idea

Military doctrine is like a really big playbook governing the actions of tens of thousands on the battlefield. It is most valuable in scrimmage, however, as the big game is played only a few times in a player’s lifetime. Scrimmage differs from war in that both sides in war aren’t always playing the same game or by the same rules or the same playing field. It’s important not to bring a knife to a gun fight.

What we do not need is doctrine developed without regard to whether knives or guns are in the hands of the bad guys, and instead focused on the illusion of a fantasy in order to feed the career needs of the fighting force. As in Transformation



7. A Tale of Teeth

The ratio of teeth to tail in a field force from Theater down is about ten to one in accordance with the historical experience of the entire Twentieth Century. Since teeth are more sexy than tail to those with little heads, a cerebral colonic inversion occurred in the Pentagon on the realization that the expertise in Corps, Field Army and Theatre Army operations lay in the Reserve Components, most predominately in the Army Reserve

Converting artillery and tanks units to a new breed of motorized infantry in short order gave the lie to the relation of MOS to combat readiness. All that matters, now as in all wars before, is that ....the government owns a piece of his/her ass. And the rest of the body doesn’t have to have all the parts issued originally.

8.  There are more wheels than COGS (Centers of Gravity)

In order to sound both appropriately pompous, erudite, and authoritative on things military, it is fashionable to use the term “Center of Gravity” to define that which the power of a belligerent emanates, and “around which” the opponent operates......

Unfortunately for the military professional, that which constitutes the Center of Gravity (COG) isn’t all that obvious. It could be geographic, political, social, economic, technical, and/or personal at multiple levels of interest.

In order for the concept of a COG to be useful to a combatant, it should be consistently understood by his or her forces, but if it were that obvious to one side, it would be obvious to the other(s). Hard to be deceptive under those circumstances,



9. Why need Regulars when Blackwater is here?

Blackwater proves that we don’t need a large standing military to raise highly technical and specialized military forces in time of need from the general population. Their excesses prove that this shouldn’t be done by the private sector


10 Rough Riders Needed

Haven’t you heard of the 1st US Volunteer Cavalry, the Rough Riders that TR led up San Juan Hill? TR raised this regiment of cavalry combining his buddies in Ivy Leaguery with some leathery friends from the Old West. Look at pictures of TR in his uniform (Night in the Museum) and his collar brass says USV for US Volunteers. In fact, the raising of (voluntary)  regiments was the default American Way of War well into WW2 before the advent of a large standing army.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/01/rough-riders-needed.html

11. PPPPPP (Prior Planning ....)

From threat-based planning – to capabilities based planning”, “From peacetime planning – to rapid adaptive planning”, and from “from forces that need to deconflict – to integrated, interdependent forces” which all means that no planning based on Mission, Enemy, Weather and Terrain is required, Modular Stabilized one-size-fits-nothing Brigades can rest in Festung Kansas and pounce with speed, agility, and precision on any and all contingency … without planning.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/01/pppppp.html

12. The Threat, the Task, Two, Three and Four

If Bush, Gates and Petraeus have their way, the Modular Brigades would have to be Civil Affairs, Intelligence, Psychological Operations and Civil Engineering brigades. Since these skills are found primarily in the Guard and Reserves, The need for a larger standing army is placed in jeopardy.


13.Victory Transformed into Defeat (Article dated 2007/01)

If Transformation had not mangled the Army’s force structure AND that force structure had been mobilized and deployed in accordance with the Army’s then existing doctrine for Stability and Counterinsurgency, we would be back home already with the Iraqi’s having a functioning government.


14.The THEY/THEM Conspiracy 

The only thing better than a really bad villain our hero can vanquish just before the final credits (or mid term election), is the evil conspiracy called THEY (aka THEM), that justifies all manner of sacrifice, hard work, and donations.

A really good THEY/THEM has all the characteristics noted of the dysfunctional Father and Mother noted in Hypocracy Analysis, a new analytical tool based on Transactional Analysis (TA).


THEY/THEM are abusive, manipulative, and mindless. Defeating the THEY/THEM requires the creation of the equally dysfunctional Heroic counterpart: pure, courageous, and therapeutic. In such a way, the Drama Triangle between victim, rescuer, and prosecutor is played out on a global scale.

While Darth Vader can be vanquished, Saddam hanged, or Castro may eventually die, the evil they did can live on past them so long as Evil is needed to rally the faithful, and can turn a simple story into a series or prime time show


15. Defense of the Continent by the Numbers
For the sake of simplicity, one could break down the US into six zones:

The Union,
the Pacific Coast,
the Mississippi,
the Confederacy,
the Great Planes,
and the Mountains,

in order of importance. The nation could be still operate with three of these in US control including one of the first three. It gets to be a problem if there are large non-contiguous areas. The geographic center of gravity is St. Louis which if controlled by a force marching from any direction is in a position to over-whelm the rest.

An prospective enemy thinking about conquering the US, would have to raise sufficient forces and project them onto our soil to overwhelm a military force of thirty million and occupy three of the six areas above. The time to raise such a force, particularly transportation assets would give the US ample time to arrange a warm and permanent greeting for those who dare.


16. A Cadre Defense

Against that day when the big balloon goes up, where the forward deployed forces have been shredded as have the grand plans from inside the magical Beltway, a backup military establishment with industry to match would be nice to have. The principal principle against that day is to follow Bedford Forrest’s dictum – “get thar fustest with the mostest!” – in short be able to muster the talent on hand, that which takes the longest lead time to develop, up and running rapidly.

The long lead time items include the larger capital ships like heavy cruisers, carriers, and Fancy Dan fighters. It includes investing in R&D, more pure than applied. And, most of all it means preserving the combat experience and military training of those who have served



17.  Full Mobilization - A Meritorious Approach

Once or twice a century, a nation has to fight for its life, where old men and boys are pressed into service to fight an invading force. Often the borders of the nation have been pierced and much of the homeland is occupied by the enemy. This is the scenario where at least ten percent of the total population is under arms and three or four times as many are in war industries. It is against this possibility that the base for this expansion must be laid in peacetime.

That which is more precious than gold, is the combat experience of previous wars as well as those with extensive training in the military arts

18. Concurrent and Networked Training
Each successive level of command consists of squad’s networks laterally with other squads of the same headquarters, and with other squads representing the chain of command, adjacent, and supporting commands. .......The replication of the chatter between squads is the sum and substance of the command post exercise (CPX). A well designed CPX is hard to distinguish from actual operations if that chatter is presented in the form and through the proper medium to the squads representing the exercised unit including the fog of war.

The Field Training Exercise is where the squads interface with the mud, dust, rain and (simulated) blood of warfare. In the field, they still are linked with other squads at platoon, company, battalion as well as the fire support system, supply system, and the other vertical and horizontal networks of the whole organization. The link between the squad is the radio.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/concurrent-and-networked-training-cure.html

19.The Shape of Things to Come is Hard to Come by

The Shape of Things to Come Always is an illusion at best. Some get parts of it right, some miss it completely, and forever, and some are in the right spot at the right time. Innovation cannot be institutionalized, and where it is, is a booby hatch,
,
It’s not that our Pentagon is particularly venal or stupid, it’s that no one's Pentagon is that smart. .... Yet, there are constants in the continuum of war by other means that go to the hearts, minds, body and terrain that demand that understand, from the outset, the secrets of Hannibal, Napoleon, Robert E Lee, Abraham Lincoln, Adolf Hitler, and others whose foot prints sink deep in the shape of things that are.

20.. Breaking The Enemy's Will (What happens when the dead don't quit?)

The question at the core of the use of force, be it economic, political, kinetic or social is why such force induce others to accept the will of the guy at other end of the force. The beatings will continue until morale improves. (Mahan and Clausewitz)"stress the concept of a massive engagement at a strategic time and place to win wars". And "start with how culture affects the structure, dynamics and cohesion and disintegration of groups be they simple aggregates or membership groups."