Too Uptight to Fight to Win

Someone quipped on LinkedIn that there was no cogent plan in Afghanistan.  Cogent plans don't work anyway.  There are two and only two planning strategies that work: Done by the Book, or Completely Wing it.  Half is half too short or too long.   The key to understanding the penchant for incompetence in the military profession I got from a seriously important book:

Dixon posits that there is a definite profile to the commander that freeze up in the clinch, Or they stick to a bad decision regardless,  His profile places the blame on the Anal Retentive.  This is Freudian which relates the Anal personality on bad potty training.  Unfortunately Ass Holes act exactly the same everywhere, where the English Public School Potty Training System does not apply.  Regardless, the typology is worth memorizing for your own protection.

The Anal Retentive obsessed with messes, seeks to put reality in something measurable,  Adrian Monk comes to mind, except that Adrian's obsession with neatness did not defeat his quest for the missing parts,

ADRIAN MONK THE OCD PI

In my experience in Vietnam metrics were God.



One could report the number on enemy KIA by the number of rounds fired into the presumed enemy positions.



1st AIR CAVALRY DIVISION DTOC 1968



Contact with the enemy had to be parsed into two sets of reports, G2 and G3,  The G2 could only report enemy initiated attacks,  All attacks or contacts as a result of friendly action were sent up G3 channels.  While in the DTOC, 1st Air Cavalry we two and three got the story straight before transmitting to IIFFV.

After Tet, we had a working operational schema although differences between flag rank units often precluded lateral contact.  The hide and seek games between G2 and G3 was discouraged by MG George I Forsyth, the Unflappable

G2-G3 OPERATIONS DESK, 1ST AIR CAV DIV 1969

The important thing to remember about any war is that the Freudian typology of Oral, Anal and Phallic applies to Stafflophucupus if not treated with a real shit storm.    Being Oral, I write and brief to the point of screaming fits heard in my CEP.

1/9th AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON - 1ST AIR CAV DIV

 Anal types have two flavors, expulsive and retentive.   The Retentive make order out of chaos, but everything not dressed right and covered down is a mess. Those whose forte is cleaning up messes is a battle cry, and recognition for excellence.  The Retentive clean up anything, and looks for messes about to happen. The Expulsive (expletive) shits on anything and anywhere.  Between the two, the rest of us emote. 

DECEMBER 6-7, 1941

Their cleanups create serious messes. At Pearl Harbor, the weapons were locked up (as they are now) in order to retain a proper count and inventory.   The airplanes were lined up neatly in the center of the fields to defend against Nisei sabotage.  The neatly lined up ships on battleship row had their hatches open to cool the  ships interior so that the expected inspecting officers would not get sweat stains on the white,

 

ONE BRIT SURVIVED AT ISANDLWANA  1879

 

The Battle of Isandlwana in Natal on January 22, 1879 the British under LTG Lord Chelmsford was wiped out by the Zulus under Ntshingwayo Khoza.  The Quartermaster had ordered the boxes of ammo screwed shut to prevent pilfering.

FIRST RANK FIRE!

Then came the Battle of Roark's Drift where real professionals defeated a world of deep shit.   The thing is knowing what is going on, what is on hand, what the troops can do, and  have things already rigged for unexpected action.

The symptoms of Dixon's Duds are here.  Like in artillery, the round doesn't detonate on contact.  The Dud aren't always duds, as they can be inspiring, brave, brilliant, innovative but freezes when the situation gets out of hand. Paulus at Stalingrad and McDowell at Antietam, are good examples.  These officers, obsessed with detail are critical as war is very messy, and without the compulsive neat freak, the ammo doesn't get there.

DR DIXON'S SYMPTOMS OF PENDNG DOOM

 The US Army has been hamstrung by the Personnel Pukes once known as the Adjutant General (AG) who place the neatness of accountability and micro managed career rotation algorithms.   In Vietnam, AG would not put a replacement to a unit (rifle companies included) until the trooper had departed on DEROS.  This added at least three months to the replacement arriving.  I never saw a rifle company in the field with more than 110 troops. This particular problem was addressed by the concept of a personnel float that is assigned to fill a slot about to happen.

WHY IS THIS IN CHINESE?

This AG Stuck Up reared it's head as a prime motive or ARPERCEN (rotational expeditionary modular brigades) spent two years doing what should have been done in concurrent training before addressing the unit,  These units were projected to arrive in a published (Army Times) schedule.  What the Taliban, Insurgents, and Al Qaeda were doing or about to do wasn't addressed until the unit was inbound. 

 Efforts to provide overlap between commanders and by constant and extraordinary update  of the tactical milieu reduced the FUBAR potential somewhat.  In Vietnam, every individual had a short timer's chat, but the units was staying in country.  This individual rotation created a penchant for being seriously killed or wounded for the FNG, Achilles and the Short (not knowing, over confidence, overly cautious).

TON SUN NHUT 1968

On the other more important hand, the  advantage of the individual rotation rota was the steadily increasing combat effectiveness kept up to date by enemy action and at the end of the war came a corps of officers and noncoms that built the Army we have today.  The increase in sophistication survived several decades.

On the other hand, after  WW 2 the quality of the US Army virtually disappeared as the NKPA crossed the 38th.  It had only been less than five years since the same Army had defeated the Japanese and Germans,

THESE ATTACKED

AND ATTACKED

YOURS TRULY IN WARZONE C 1968

TEA LEAVES, GOAT ENTRAILS OR F4F IT

The Eighth US Air Force suffered the greatest casualty in its day light precision bombing campaign over Germany suffered a higher casualty rate than the US Army Ground Forces, and higher than the Japanese Kamikaze campaign.  Post War bombing surveys of these efforts, particularly “carpet bombing” reported that it had marginal effects on war production.   The objective of strategic bombing was to kill and destroy enough people and materiel to persuade the enemy leadership to surrender.  Each new campaign was predicated on some estimate that the destruction of this target or that would bring Hitler to the bargaining table.   He died in his bunker while Soviet Troops pillaged Berlin.

STRATEGIC BOMBING AND FEEDING THE DEEATED

The B-29 high altitude bombing of Japan had marginal effect on Japanese production, so General LeMay switched to low altitude incendiary bombing of the homes of “war workers” (women, kids, old people) to bring the Japanese people to demand a surrender.   It did influence Emperor Hirohito to stage a palace coup and using his status as God-Emperor announced Japan’s surrender.  Japanese Emperors reigned but did not rule. The Army was prepared to fight to the last civilian. But no one argues with a God.

BEFORE THE SLAUGHTER WOULD HAVE LANDED, THE EMPEROR SEIZED POWER

President Francisco Solano Lopes of Paraguay (1862-1860) in the War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) cost the loss of over half the population of Paraguay. He died when the last of his army tried to disarm him. In the meantime, he had executed any potential internal threat.  Later in a new war over drilling rights called the Grand Chaco War (1932-1935) a highly German trained Bolivian Army failed to crush Paraguay.   Paraguay is very egalitarian, so much so that government is more mirage than reality, but don’t mess with Paraguay, their culture is rough and ready.

Then there was Shock and Awe. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was one shock that did not awe, but angered the US population to switch from Isolationism to vengeance and war. Now, instead of indiscriminate bombing that killed civilians, we are now engaged in “Counter Terror” targeted assassinations that kill innocent civilians in hopes that the families and neighbors of our mistakes will rise up and in sweep away the Terrorist.   

Unlike the Phoenix Program in Vietnam where the Phoenix agent lived in the villages and districts where VC threat was mines, booby traps, targeted assassinations and incoming.  That program pulled the VC infrastructure out by the roots, to be replaced by NVA dignitaries after NVA tanks took the Presidential Palace.

Therefore, it seems obvious that the irrational rationale behind killing civilians or strategic nodules, might do better with tea leaves, sheep entrails, or 52 Pickup.   We are guessing intentions with a dogma that does not deal in intentions, that is added after the “correlation of forces” or the “design” mush.  Perhaps it is time to develop a GI proofed arm and hand signal based analytical tool to factor in intentions and motive.  I call it F4F.

F4F is a catalyst that interacts with the mission and the culture(s) of those involved in a combat operation and provides appropriate questions to ask, and answers to be factored along with METT-TCulture. 

 F4F is culture centric with one assumption, that life is the center of attention.  To wit, nutrition and procreation to survive.  Also known as Feed & Breed, Dinner & Date plus consequences, those consequences known as the grandkid’s grandkids. 

F4F has four levels: Biological, Psychological, Sociological and Technological and knowing this list is not necessary: 

 Biological: 

 Feeding and breeding exists in microbes, viruses, college fraternities, and GI’s with a three day pass.

ADDAMS FAMILY VALUES

Psychological:   

There are conflicts of interest when the interests are in feeding and breeding.  The conflict for feeding is no game (dinner v diner, diners over dinner), the conflict over breeding is all game.   They psychological roles necessary to survive are to protect and nurture the young.  The strategies involved range from producing hundreds of young against the odds of making to the sea, or long periods of gestation, or in herds. In each strategy the drama of survival is simply heroes v villains, the latter be competition in feeding or breeding.   In some vertebrates the young come in eggs, in others the young can walk on day one.  In each case, the young must be aggressively protected until old enough to leave.  Don’t mess with Mother Bear when her cubs are in the danger zone.   Do not walk under trees with occupied bird’s nests or face it in the hair.

THE SOPRANO CORLEONE FAMILY

F4F divvies up the algorithm of creation into two camps, hero and villain.

Father (protector), Mother (nurturer) and Infant (grow):

Heroic:   Knight, Nurse, Infant 

PROTECT AND NURTURE -9mm

Villain:     Murderer, Manipulator, Mad.

NEED A VILLAIN? MAKE ONE UP?

The F4F Drama Triangle(s) are based on Dr Stephen Karpman’s “Drama Triangle” which is a key part of Transactional Analysis (TA) which of course applies to combat as the ultimate drama triangle.   The drama is derived from role switching between any of the six roles (Victim to Vicious, Nurse to Manipulator, etc).  

Stamp Collecting

CHARLIE BROWN COLLECTS BROWN STAMPS TO CASH IN FOR A FREE MURDER

Each role switch gives the switcher a psychological payoff called “stamps” in Transactional Analysis.  If the outcome desired by the individual or group is to be a perpetual victim, he,  she or they go through life collecting Brown stamps.   Collecting enough Brown stamps in the mind of the collector(s) is often traded in for a Red (rage), White (purity & innocent) and Black (Death).  

Sociological: 

Each cultural group, of whatever size or type has Rules that stamp collecting that is related to group survival fall into two sets of Rules (Social Status) and the physical world (Stuff). 

 Social Status: Face, Fate, Fame and Fortune.

A SUB CULTURE HAS IT'S OWN RULES AND ROLES

This is portrayed by the use of one hand above the waist pointing to the face, up in the air, a wave, and the open palm.  Fate is like source of authority as in fad, style, and/or regulations.   When Face is more important than Fate, Fame suffers. Fortune is mainly how the fortune is obtained (baker, candlestick maker)

Stuff: Time, Distance, Ground and Body.

THE HAND JIVE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE WORDS

This is portrayed with two hands below the waist:  Point at watch, two hands apart, point at ground and to belly and heart (or groin).

  

Technological:  behaviors, skills, tools, training, and equipment that facilitate a net psychological buzz (stamps) by following the Rules that enhance the desired Roles 

 A Maserati gains face, fame, for access between bodies that produce (maybe) another generation. The female selection algorithm is mysterious and inconsistent between muscle and money.

APPLIED F4F:

F4F is not a matrix, nor checklist, nor format.   It is not designed to be a grand plan in the Oval Office but is applicable to any level of command between boots and triggers to PowerPoint and coded doors. Neither is it a Gordian Knot, but a little closer to the spaghetti behind your desktop, or a ball of yarn after the cat played with it.  You take one strand at a time, and follow it and follow the yarn that are connected.

The Maserati might be a start.  First question is what Fortune fostered this glamour?  How was the money made?  What Fate allowed the aggregation of wealth?   Is the Face of the owner enhanced despite the warts? The Ground the car drives on includes roads, across bridges, to a place that takes Time to travel the Distance   

OPERATION (CLASSIFIED)

 The truck driver in (classified) has to drive from (classified) to (classified).  She wants to know the condition of the roads through (classified) to (classified).   How are the buildings in (classified) built, of what materials (beer can sheets, mud, brick, reinforced concrete). And are there alleys or are the buildings glued together like in Italy or Mexico?   The little black shapes on a 1:50,000 don’t show that, an aerial view might.

WHERE MEXICAN SILVER WAS MINED

The platoon leader In Operation” X” in (classified) wants to know the same questions in his/her area of operations and also wants to know the “Face” issues of all involved including all players that relate to the probability of stand and die, cut and run, or cut a deal.   

QL 13 THUNDER ROAD, WHERE THE RUBBER MET THE ROAD

After a while in an area, the average trooper gets a feel for this.  F4F provides a quick guide to seek out the answers which may exists already in some database or SME or Combat Farmer.  F4F adds the significance, motive, intention in the comparison of courses of action.  These considerations apply to the entire Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) or Operational Design and to all the factors of METT-TC.  This process can be fed by information already coded in ASCOPE, PMESII-PT, CIA Country Studies, or the scuttlebutt with the real skinny.

End Note.

Curses be upon whomever makes this a mandatory class, or required course, or flip chart, flash card, or MOS skill indicator. This is for people especially the reader once having read this.  A reminder: Just look at your two hands, then to your gut, and you will remember,110505

Wealth Begets Not War Frustration Does.

In response to a Stratfor Opinion Piece on the increased sophistication of SE Asian Military Forces which asserted that Capitalism begets military expansionism as shown by the new higher tech expansion of SE Asian and Chinese weaponry.
 

Soviet Film "Battleship Potemkin after a 1905 Black Sea Mutiny

 

"I  see a new mythology under beta test here, to the end First Principle what wealth begets military might which is manifested by "high end" materiel.   This Retro-Red point of view hung up with a world view of the rise of the evil capitalist bourgeoisie is necessarily militaristic is a fairy tale to frighten College Freshmen. 

Collage of Anti-War demonstrators waving Viet Cong flag

 

 

The reverse is true, in an age of declining resources, the biggest and baddest gun gets to goodies, like low tech food, gas, ammo, housing, and girls. To  that end, poor nations are kept poor. Any attempt to un-poor them is a clear and present threat to the hoarding gunsel faction.

 

 

To break this cycle of poverty begetting guns which begets poverty, one injects fancy guns to the gunsel faction.   The important thing to note, is that guns are status symbols and the bigger the gun the better.  This upgrade in gunnery works to faciltate fatness of the starved with guns that don't work on the street.  And too expensive to be used by the rabble.

 

The "downsizing" of large primitive forces into smaller more effective and better armed with the sexy and flashy bringing fear to the neighbors, raises the social status based on high tech standoffs.  Spit and Shine Soldiers don't like to get their boots dirty, and eventually become neutered.

 

See this:

After the Ad, the PLA

(Music by Hans Zimmer)

The Law of Inverse Attribution Reflex (L'IAR) applied to this vibrant dedication to the martial might of the Peoples Republic is bragging about their weakest virtue, the PLA.  Their strongest virtue is balancing enterprise with political stability.  The role of the PLA has been put the shadow of the growth of Communist Capitalism.

 

Gordon

 

 

REMFCOM, FUBAR, and Failure

Few can criticize the shortfalls of a decade of blood, sweat and tears on the conduct of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and (CLASSIFIED) of the combat efficiency and effectiveness of the troops on the ground, or in the just over.  That which was accomplished was done in the face of serious efforts by REMFCOM (Pentagon) most particularly by the Mufti Cabal aka SES aka Senior Executive Service. 

Those in uniform in the Pentagon are transients as are the appointed.  The efforts to emasculate the chain of command, from flags to boots follows a clearly identifiable trail over twenty years long.  No one other than the Permanent Party (SES) has the longevity to pursue a single minded effort to neuter our armed forces in order to control the troops through personnel mismanagement or control the procurement process without regard to the directions that develop in the field.

Criticism of the actions of any establishment from someone outside that establishment either entrenches justifications for that action or does a complete 180.  This happened Immediately after the Fall of Saigon, any doctrine, hardware, or type units having justified it's existence of Stability Operations were wiped clean.

Aviation and Special Forces were able to re enter the arena after showing relevance of Fulda and of certain Caribbean adventure.

In rebuilding the Army post Vietnam which also included the Mobilization matrix that Jimmy Carter kicked off. The Congress, exercising it's specified powers over military doctrine and organization made the requirement that reserve and Guard units must have a valid combat contingency plan.   The plan created wartime alignments between specific contingencies and the units designated to carry them out.  This was known as the Capstone Alignment of units and a Capstone mission which by law and regulation all units regardless of component had to adhere to. 

Some units had more than one.  The 49th Lone Star Armor Division had a III Corps contingency mission with NORTHAG, the NATO command that covered the North German plain.  I commanded a MI Bn (CEWI type) aligned with the 49th.  All my training plans had to show a clear alignment with operations and plans of those in my Capstone mission.  The 49th also had a mission in the defense of Japan and flew to Japan to participate in the annual Yama Sakura exercise with the Japanese SDF.

The existence of the Capstone program had a downside, it cut the Flag Ranks in the administrative garrison establishment out of determining which way units were to jump.  Fifth US Army and the 90th ARCOM  then in San Antonio worked overtime to wreck the linkage between unit commander and the Capstone mission.

Desert Storm showed REMFCOM (Pentagon) that Weekend Warriors not only could fight, but often better than the Full Time amateurs, particularly in Artillery and Aviation. This was always the case since the airplane and the cannon were invented. This competence in combat posed a Clear and Present Danger to REMFCOM control of the definition of war and of promotion timing and opportunity of AC Field Grades.

In between the Iraq Wars, a group of hacks masquerading as a doctrine research element created a fake doctrine called "Transformation" which restored the Pentomic Battle Group (disbanded under JFK) but with the addition of field grade command positions that the Battle Group took away.  The "Modular" Brigades were identical with no regard to METT-Tc.  The field grades missing from the Battle Group were restored with mini-battalions, but most importantly, the two O-6 Colonel command slots that were dropped from the Pentomic division when the three brigade organization of the ROAD division was adopted.

The move to Kuwait and the invasion of Iraq was done with the ROAD MTOE, but as soon as possible  Transformation was instigated but with no notion or concept by REMFCOM (Pentagon) of logistics and fires.  The organization of fires in Continental, Union, Confederate, and Armies of the United States was top of the World Class ranking.  American logistics were the best since the Romans,  Both had to go.

Artillery is never sub optimized, fire support is centrally coordinated with the priority of fires and ammunition supply rate.  Transformation diluted firepower due to the dominance of National Guard artillery. :Likewise  logistics which formerly consisted of a task organized Combat Service Support (CSS) and Service Support predominantly from the Army Reserve were dismembered, and privatized. 

In order to camouflage the destruction of the effectiveness of the Field Army, REMFCOM deception and psychological operation directed against the US Congress, American People, the Congress, and the Total Force, "Capstone" was reset as a buzzword, back by a fabrication called "operational reserve" to replace a non-existent program called "strategic reserve"
.
.   

FEAR OF FOG FREEZES

Fear of Fog, Freezes Minds and Fosters

Indecision in the Face of the Fog of War

 Indecision, hesitation, and disagreement at command and staff levels ar endemic and if allowed to run unchecked leaves the battle to the bold.  The Fog of War is the default status of information of who is doing what, where, when and with what. That includes all involved, regardless of whom.  Grant and Sherman at Vicksburg, and Lee and Jackson at Chancellorsville demonstrated that rare ability described in French as coup d'oeil,  the ability to see at a glance the big picture under all the fog, smoke, and fire of battle.  All had the knack of a grasp of the whole when many of the parts were missing and some were wrong.  Of those four commanders, only one (Robert E Lee) would have been selected for higher command or the War College

Union Plan to flank Lee and march to Richmond A

Grant and Sherman were old and close friends with Grant helping Sherman recover from deep depression and despair.  Both had left the Army before the war and both had experienced failure as civilians.  Jackson was mediocre as an instructor at VMI, and not the career centric courtier that thrive with the Golden Cockroaches that infest the walls of power.  Lee was also rare, particularly today, as the perfect example of the Tidewater aristocracy that included George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.

It requires a deep understanding of the relationship between what the Soviets called the Correlation of Forces (COF), which is a broader concept than balance of power. It includes understanding the quirks of dirt, fire and maneuver and impact of the fog of war on the minds of opposing players.  The impact of the fog of war is an understanding of how a leader or manager deals with fog (missing, lost, false, and errant pieces of information.  The fog of war is also found in any decision making body absent the firepower.

Lee splits his army to hold his right and a punch to the nose with his left

The principal problem of some in positions of power is that some can't make a decision until all the pieces are accounted for, confirmed, and lead to certainty.  One British writer, Norman Dixon wrote "On the Psychology of Military Incompetence" about forty years ago, and promptly forgotten and dismissed ... until now when copies of his book is expensive.  His thesis asserts that Assholes  (closest clinical term) lose battles.  More specifically, the Anal Retentive whose sense of security is secured by no shit, no messes, no confusion, orderly, clean and in accordance with regulations. 

Uncertainty in combat intelligence and operational information triggers a rigid hesitation to make decisions absent extra and comforting information that fits the templates. The correlation of shit to shot requires balls, the balls to shoot without all the shit being cleaned up. 

Lee hits Hooker with a wide left hook, while staring a force three times his size in the face

While the Anal Retentive are hesitant in uncertainty, they can be otherwise fearless, inventive, creative and inspiring leaders.  Hooker, Burnside, Fremont, and others were fearless in the face of certainty.  Grant and Sherman having lived in uncertainty and survived, knew that of ten courses of action one end certain victory and the other certain defeat, taking the first one in the middle that comes to mind and go balls to the wall wins.

Some students of the military art and the role that Assholes play in it are coming around to see the correlation in the US military between an obsession over appearance and hesitation to act, and an ever expanding need for visions of certainty: more troops, more supplies,  more intelligence, anything that provides a camouflaged pacifier.   In Afghanistan, after SOF had run the Taliban out of town, some flag rank got furious over SOF troops wearing beards, an essential status symbol in Afghanistan. 

.Indecision to the point of rash decision of the type typified by the Charge of the Light Brigade results when the indecisive mind freezes on the flight of fancy or self delusion.

Patton is an example of one who knew which shit was important and demanded a high standard of appearance and high risk when the odds favored action. It stems, so Dr Dixon says, from excessive excitement over a child's toilet training, which in the British military he traces back to excessive shit over shit in the English boarding school system.   That the diagnosis fits many cultures, the trace back to potty training doesn't hold where in both Japanese and German child raising lets the rug rats run loose, but the leash is tightened by peer pressure later.

Maps by Hal Jespersen, www.cwmaps.com

Failure to let the Generals Command the Commands at War.

The Generals Were Cut Out of the Action 

Gordon S Fowkes, LTC USA (RET)

Failure, by Thomas A Ricks an alleged expert on military affairs in his recent book and article in Atlantic magazine places the blame for failure in OIF and OEF squarely on the shoulders of the General (Flag rank) Officers.  By so doing, he demonstrates an abysmal awareness of what the military business and the profession at arms is all about   

In short, the generals have for well over a decade been cut out of the chain of command and key staff lines of coordination from the A-Ring to Afghanistan.  The default command and control of US military forces is depicted in Article I Section 8, clauses  10-17 of the specified powers of the Congress (raise, equip, and provide for doctrine).  Article I, Section 10,  Clauses 1 and 3 deny the States from having full time “standing troops” or ships of war in time of peace, allowing them in times of invasion or insurrection.  The Second Amendment guarantees the States right to maintain a militia subject to the doctrine provided pursuant to Congressional Guidance.

http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html

The President in Article II, Section 2, clauses 1 and two is Commander in Chief of the armed services of the US including state forces under federal control (National Guard). He has the sole right to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate, all commissioned “officers of the united states” which includes cabinet members, judges, and all military officers.  Officers make law within their jurisdiction that enforceable in US courts, which includes failure to pick up all cigarette butts if ordered to do so. Officers as such carry the authority of the sovereignty of all the states through Senate confirmation, which the same as for treaties.

During WW2 when the explosive growth of US armed forces demanded a rapid field promotion system and the authority to promote officers to flag rank (General) was delegated to the Theatre Commanders (Bradley. Ike, Mac,  Nimitz and Vandenberg)  Thus if a four star screwed up, the Theatre Commander could relieve him, two stars fell like snow. Today, all appointments to command positions for generals and admirals have to be approved by the Senate and the promotion authority for officers’ rests in the hands of service level promotion boards, and not in the field. During Vietnam, promotions to Captain were delegated to field army level.

Civil Servants and Contractors are not commissioned officers, military, diplomatic, judicial or of any  other kind.  Their future lies in the hands of contracting officials not responsible for battlefield success as are commissioned Officers.

Ricks is clearly not aware that the law that applied in WW2 is a distant memory.  The best a higher commander can do is to relieve for cause which is something not taken lightly.  Murphy’s Law is the First Law of Warfare, so screw ups and disasters go with the territory.  Real civilians can hire, fire or promote based on ankle and elbow test results.  Civil Servants work and get paid during “duty hours” forty per week plus or minus leave time.  All military personnel are on duty 24/7 with specified leaves or passes and still subject to military authority. 

There has been a movement most intense for the last twenty years to remove flag and field grade officers from the staff and command of the chain of command, and replace them with civil servants and contractors neither of whom have the carefully designed authority of  a military chain of command and staff.  US officers and non commissioned officers spend ten to twenty percent of their full time active service in residential service training an education over a twenty plus year time in service.

Contractors, Civil Service and  even the Pentagon Permanent Party (Senior Executive Service) have but a tiny fraction of the formal education of those in uniform.  In order to enhance job retention and security, the Pentagon Permanent Party, now in control of acquisitions and personnel, ensure that the uniformed passing through Pentagon do so quickly and without impact.

SecDef MacNamara was particularly incensed at the surfeit of uniforms in key command and staff positions and decided that what had worked for almost 200 years needed fixing and the Guard and Reserves were not called, and advanced mathematical models invented to humiliate those whose experience was more earthy.  Field Marshal von Rumsfeld continued the purging of flag and field ranks who had the temerity to use combat proven and tested doctrine, and invented the current system of task organization (Expeditionary Transformational Rotational Modularity).   

This tore the combat support, combat service support, and service support organizations out of the walls, floors and ceilings, outlawed the use of the names, and reallocated the functions to favorite contractors and civilian organizations, leaving the experienced flag and field ranks scurrying around to find anything that would allow them to add their professionalism to the fight. Combat commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq reported that there was little or no military sense in the allocation and management of logistics. Where it not for the fact that the Army, Navy, and Air Force Guard and Reserve units were not deployed as trained allowed enough of them to take jobs in the Contractor Mob and make good money. 

As the traditional task organization of squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade (group, regiment) division, corps, field army, army group was flushed toilet wise, and the CS, CSS. SS logistics structure pulled off the chains of command the necessary and well-rehearsed operational competence was shredded.  It is fortunate that these procedures had been ingrained in the services under the Congressionally mandated mobilization alignment in the Capstone Program to real contingency plans, the screw up factor would have made Bladensburg look like a blitzkrieg.

In short, the generals have been yanked out of effective control of line and staff, and what was left of that was put up for bid.

In order to address the sense of duty denied, there are those in the political election business who are trying to subvert those of uniform to participate or appear to participate in posing as players in partisan national politics.  

There is a substantive legal difference between service members in general and officers in particular and civil servants doing the same job, and further with contractors, even those former military personnel.  The military can be ordered into considerably more dangerous situations than civilians, and cab be tried for life for refusal or failure.  A civilian is fired for failure to perform, not imprisoned. 

The "blame" for failure of operations in OIF/OEF I do place on the contractors per se, but on the Pentagon from stripping the flag and field officers in command of maneuver troops effective command and control of their logistics.  The contractors are bound by the terms of their contracts, which were drawn up by a centralized "procurement" organization.  As such, these logistics elements cannot be prioritized or moved around by the same echelon of command that used be able to for mission requirements. 

 A Rand Study published in 2000 traces the evolution of the Army Division of the XXth Century and cautions against busting up the divisional structure before it was done on the Capture of Baghdad/

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1211.pdf

That which was sliced off the divisional Discom to form the modular support battalions of the modular brigade was done by dividing the assets equally between modular brigades, not driven by priority of fires and maneuvers. The new modular brigade (except Stryker) had two maneuver battalions instead of two to five as needed.  Two maneuver battalion is not flexible enough, and the commanders in the field had to cannibalize units and resort the assets to form additional maneuver teams.  Many field artillery battalions (fires) were re-tasked as infantry as were headquarters companies.  As of now (a decade later) the third battalion is being restored.

The original intent of the modular two-maneuver battalion modular brigade was to restore the number of O-6 (Colonel) command positions formerly in the Pentomic Infantry division of the Fifties which had five O-6 command positions for each of five "Battle Groups" which each had five rifle companies plus two for weapons, support and command.  Since there was no battalion in the mix, there was no O-5 command slot, and the only place a competent infantry Lt Col could get command time was in an Armored Division.  The Armored division did not have the Pentagonal curse. Thus Armored officers and a few lucky armored infantry officers had the requisite command time for promotion to colonel.

The Pentomic Division was replaced with the same organization as the Armored division which went on until Transformation surfaced.  The post-Vietnam task organization of combat divisions for missions removed one of the three divisional brigade command slots to put a National Guard Separate Brigade under divisional control on mobilization in place of one of the divisional brigades.  The cost the Regular Army one each O-6 command slot for each affected division.

This had to stop. The Capstone Program assigning Guard units a combat mission for existing contingencies was a clear and present danger to promotion opportunity and timing of the O-6 regular officer.  This was an integral part of planning for future missions before 9-11.

The Pentagon set about a deception plan on how they were going to restore the three lost O-6 command slots, and quietly re-tooled the Battle Group to have additional field grade staff and command slots (O-4 and O-5) by slicing up divisional combat support and combat service support assets to support the new modular brigades.  By reallocating the existing maneuver (IN/AR) battalions in pairs created five Modular Brigades restoring the three O6^ command positions.  And it reallocated combat support and combat service support staff and command positions to favor combat support officers.  This was a tactical force design intended for promotions.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/63-3/Ch9.htm

The end result of slicing up the DISCOM, COSCOM, TAACOM and other TOE logistics and support organization and replacing them with ad hoc contract aggregates also removed the justification for Flag Rank command positions of those and related TOE organizations.  There were no more Area Support Groups, Transportation Groups, MP brigades, Petroleum Groups et al which made up the support structure. 

Not only were the chain of staff and command structures torn asunder, but the experience of how to do that disappears from doctrine.  All of the workings of a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) etc had been undergoing command post exercises of entire corps which included forces from all services and components but those of allied forces as well. 

All of the tables of organization, tables for allocation of resources were contained in field manuals that have been used as updated by technology, circumstance that any officer, noncom or service person could slip into any organization, and know what to do.  Now it's company policy and contract provisions.

In ten years, the experience base will start to erode to the point that years will be needed to restore. 

The stated intent of Transformation was for light, fast and agile forces, what they got was a force with maneuver limited to an extent not seen in the field since the Spanish American War. Transformation was intended to make life simple for the Pentagon to move around, but which required an extraordinary force of troops to make work.

For that reason, I stand in awe of the professional competence of our troops that made an impossible task seem simple.  The forces I served with in Germany, Japan and Vietnam would have been stopped cold with the kind of Mickey Mouse Transformation served up by Pentagon.

This is what General Dempsey knows he has to fix, but the quagmire in the Pentagon is full of mines and obstacles placed to preserve and protect lifetime employment of the Permanent Party.