Full Spectrum Victory

Capturing the enemy’s capitol is a very important move, one which symbolizes the collapse of the enemy’s political center. But sometimes the symbolism isn’t enough to make the other guy stop fighting. Napoleon found that at Moscow, and we found it a Baghdad. Moscow was merely the place from whence Muscovite power emanated, but the command and control system was in the hands of the Tsar. The capture of Bagdad did mean the end of effective Saddamite governance, but that governance was based on a tricky balance of power between the various Iraqi components of Iraqi political power, to wit, the Shiites, the Sunnis, Kurds and Baathists diehards. Without an effective central power to wheel deal and confuse these factions, the political order returned to chaos.



Fortunately for the good guys, the troops cycling through the military school system brought back the now familiar story of the resurrection of counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine now published in FM 3-24, FM 3-0, and in the upcoming Field Manual on Stability Operations. The last two publications at the time of this writing from Ft Leavenworth call for Full Spectrum military operations in which firepower and soft power are complementary and supplementary in achieving effective governance, essential services, and economic viability deemed essential to define a victory in terms of the end state achieved whereby the vanquished aren’t.




Gone are the halcyons days of marching the enemy’s army under the yoke on their way to the slave market, or of the carting off of art works and other attractive plunder as marks of victory. It appears that in order to win, one must both break up the enemy’s cohesion, then stitch it back again in order to call it a victory. Odd, but the lessons of Post WW 2 Germany, Japan, and Austria show exactly that.




Military victory then is not the end, but a mid point. The Soviets clearly understood that as there was a well defined post victory process of elimination of private property, and the creation of all encompassing totalitarian institutions. The whole process took a few short months in Latvia when that country fell under the Soviet yoke at the beginning and again at the end of WW 2. This old Soviet program is identical to that which Hugo Chavez has been trying to implement in Venezuela. And Chavez is not a Lenin nor is he a Stalin. The failure of the Soviet model crippled the attempt in the Peoples Republic of Vietnam in emulate it, so the new model is Capitalist Communism along Chinese models.



Hill of Crosses in Lithuania for those murdered by the Soviets

The Soviets in their heyday knew exactly what form of governance and economics their military action was geared to. The political commissars and apparatchiks knew where to go and who to lock up. The foundations of the new order was already built both outside the target country in inside.

We did something similar in WW 2 by adhering to the claims of legitimacy of the exiled governments of Europe and the support of their return to power. The same principle in Asia didn’t work as well as the incoming structure had to compete with a nascent native military and governmental structure either built by the Japanese or in opposition thereto. The Indonesian Army was originally created by the Japanese and opposed the returning Dutch, and the Viet Minh in Vietnam were in opposition to the Japanese and opposed the returning French. In Myanmar the Japanese created Burmese Army switched sides and is still in power.

The immediate occupations of Germany and Japan recognized the legitimacy of the police and courts, and were run in tandem for the first few years of occupation. The collapse of Iraqi police and governance is a situation found rare in the annals of wars from the Enlightenment on. But this all was understood in the old Civil Affairs and Military Government establishment. Plans were laid in anticipation of occupation and the preservation of order, and economic vitality were prepared, at least by the forces in the field.

US Occupation of Japan before Korea

The US government’s policy for Germany was originally based on the Morgenthau Plan which was aimed at reducing Germany to an agricultural state bereft of its industrial muscles. Likewise insufficient planning was made, but the capacity to put a plan in place by the Shogun Douglas MacArthur by distributing the tons of excess food and supplies left over from the preparations for the assault of the main islands of Japan. Lucius Clay did also, defying orders from on high to crush Germany.



The Russian way of war is to place deep cover agents in high places in their enemy’s military and political structure. This approach prepares cracks in the enemy’s inner structure which military power is applied for leverage. Even former SS troops were quickly brought into the Volks Polizei, and some German formations switched sides at the end. This also happened in Portugal when the Salazar dictatorship folded when some Portuguese Army units turned out to have deep cover Communist commanders.

Part of any plan to go to war, even in defense of the Homeland, should include provision of plans and plants in the enemy structures to frustrate their efforts and enhance our. This requires a deep understanding of the group dynamics within the prospective enemy. The British ignored a feeler from the German Army at the beginning of WW 2 to support a coup. This was ignored and millions died as a result.

Even if the inner circles of a potential enemy are impenetrable to deep cover agents of our own, the structure of group dynamics, of mores, customs, behaviors and buzz words should be kept on the ready rack.

Normally it is not practical to determine a peace time end state until the tide has turned for sure. The nuts and bolts of the WW 2 end state weren’t crafted until the Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran, Quebec and Yalta with a final deal at Potsdam after the German surrender. And even after that the Carthaginian and Draconian edicts of the US government had to be scrapped and replaced by the Marshall Plan. One might wonder what might have happened if a Marshall plan had been offered in late 1944.

The losing side has to gain something out of the agreement, something that would be useful for the losing side after an occupation. Germany and Japan got a viable economy and functioning governance, of the type recommended by FM 3-24 and FM 3-0.

We left Vietnam in the lurch in 1973 without the symbiotic logistic and fire support link between the US and Vietnam necessary for national survival as in that case, the enemy was still undefeated even though their imminent defeat brought about by Rolling Thunder had brought them to peace talks. There was nothing for the North to gain from not completing their ambition of conquest.

Likewise in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no end state on the table that would benefit the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda. As Al Qaeda is a non-state actor, no viable end state that is useful to us viable. The same is not the case with the Taliban, as effective governance or participation in governance is very much an end state desired by the Taliban, and which other parties in the area are willing to consider. This would mean an end-state like that which might have appeared should Hitler been assassinated on June 20, 1944. That would have been a very different peace than that which was imposed in 1945.

Jaw/War

Capturing Moscow didn’t help Napoleon, and in fact, set him on a downhill slide that ended in Paris. Capturing Paris was a fleeting victory for Hitler. Capturing Philadelphia and New York didn’t help the British either. Certainly capturing Baghdad didn’t help us, and in fact was about as useful as stomping on a Texas ant hill. Battle may be like capture the flag, but war isn’t. Battle may have it’s odds like craps, or poker, but war is more like 52 pickup with three incomplete decks of cards from different games.

While battle is often waged not only to smash something, or grab something, it is also used to make a statement. The Thirteen Days in October 1962 recognized the notion of negotiating with displays of kinetic force, like a blockade and a saber rattle. The Alamo made a statement about Texian resolve. The Doolittle Raid made a similar statement about American resolve, and in fact prodded Admiral Yamamoto into losing four aircraft carriers. Bombing Ghaddafi’s home in the desert seems to have brought him into a reversal of his support of terrorism regardless of stripe.

Sometimes, however, the other side isn’t listening. The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor to induce us into negotiations, which negotiations were completed on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Hirohito listened and pulled a coup to overthrow military control of the Japanese government when faced with the real possibility of Soviet Occupation and American nuclear annihilation. Hitler didn’t listen at all, and died in his bunker. Ho Chi Minh didn’t listen either. It remains an interesting “if” if we had taken the Plain of Jars by 1968 and seen whether Ho Chi Minh would have let the Chinese come into Vietnam like the Chinese in Korea.

Occupying Richmond and defeating Robert E Lee ended the War Between the States, but only temporarily freed the slaves which slavery continued under other guises until Brown vs the Board of Education, and with Affirmative Action action. The resentment of the white Southerner to Reconstruction wrecked Reconstruction, and the resentment of the white Southerner to heavy handed Federal aka Yankee interference in local events still plays out in our elections.

It is probably useful to be able to establish some form of military doctrine about the non-kinetic effects of battle which itself has kinetic and non-kinetic means. Psychological Operations has a history of interesting effects of non-kinetic energy.

Operation Moolah in Korea was an offer of a payment of $30,000 to any Chinese or North Korean pilot that flew a Mig-15 to South Korea. While we did get a Mig, the real effects were the stripping of Communist air cover over North Korea for several weeks while the Communists grounded their planes for fear of the defection of any of their pilots. The Poles caused the Germans to lose one full day of war production by issuing a fake proclamation allegedly by Nazi headquarters giving Hitler’s birthday off for Polish war workers.

The analysis of this apparent anomaly leads us to make a serious change of how we define victory and how to get it. What separates a Hitler from a Hirohito? What separates the successful occupations of their lands from our attempts to Reconstruct the South or of Iraq? How do we know we have won?

I suggest we define victory or success in war is when the other side enforces our wishes with their own police and courts and other agencies of political, economic and social power. I suggest that victory comes when the other side sees a long term advantage in their own interests in cutting a deal.

Germany and Japan benefited from our occupation and were a non-belligerent ally in the Cold War. The South took over a century to recover from Reconstruction economically. In both those cases victory was dictated from the barrel of a gun. What would have happened if Lincoln had missed the play, and what would have happened if we had flooded Germany and Japan with Carpet Baggers and Scalawags?

The approach to a victory, then depends on the carrot and stick offered to those in the opposing side’s structure who have a dog in the game. Sometimes this isn’t the Boss, but someone willing to sell him out, or culling the Boss to cut and run. And it is often those closest to the Boss who are his weakest point. Himmler tried to pull off a coup and cut a deal with the Allies, Hitler wound up appointing Admiral Doenitz as Fuhrer, while Doenitz wasn’t hard core Nazi.

When it gets down to defeating the enemy, however defined, it is the informal structure of power, and the role of personality that counts.

Some leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, and Saddam were brilliant practitioners of the art of survival by divide and control within, but not so hot in managing combat forces. Each of these three applied the Law of Inverse Relevance by touting their military infallibility which, if a virtue, was the least of them. The confidence of nations under leadership of this nature is based on a lie.

Incurring defeatism and division in the enemy’s ranks is the most popular way to achieve non-kinetic victory. Accordingly, President Wilson took no chances with pro-German elements in America nor was he tolerant even of the slightest hint of defeatism. Wilson established the Committee of Public Information (CPI) under George Creel to operate as a de-facto ministry of Propaganda. Wilson’s Sedition Act banned “uttering … any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the United States government or the military” (this from Goldberg’s book ‘Liberal Fascism’). Breaking into this form of psychological control is a tough nut to crack.

The trick is to identify the segments of the other side who are willing to cut a deal and who are willing to implement our policies afterward.

These segments aren’t always the same bunch. We reduced Germany and Japan to smoking wreckage in hopes of inducing them to kick their leadership out for it was assumed that killing civilians would be a positive motivator for the civilians. That didn’t work in bringing down the regime in charge, but it certainly made a splendid motivator to keep out of the business of conquest afterward. Likewise, the Russians didn’t venture into hot wars until Afghanistan.

It is popular to demonize the demon in charge of the enemy as a snake. Cutting the head of the snake is also a popular sound bite in planning for victory, but sometimes you don’t have a snake, but a can of worms, or an ant hill … like in the Muddle East. It might have worked if Hitler had been killed on July 20, 1944. But killing Osama Bin Ladin isn’t likely to end Islamic terrorism as this movement grows heads as fast as they are cut off. Snake analogies don’t help when there is no snake.

Since Secretary of Defense Gates has taken charge, there is less of Rumsfeldian bombast, and a ripple of curtains behind which deals are being cut. In this current drama, fuss and fury are theatre. Helzbollah was suckered into dropping it’s cloak of invisibility and showed it’s hand as a meddler in Lebanese politics than a partisan of Palestinian liberation. Syria is talking to Israel about peace while calming the Iranians and Palestinians with promises not to be kept.

In short, I hope that it is the Gates paradigm that appears to be positively engaged in engaging the key players of the Muddle East with the traditional mix of jawing and warring at the same time. Call it Jaw Wars. It’s also as deeply engrained in Chinese government and politics as it is in the Muddle East, or in Chicago.