The recent announcement that General Petraeus, senior commander in Iraq, is being considered for assignment as top NATO commander is clear proof of the proposition that COIN is antithetical to Transformation, and his success in battle threatens billions of acquisition dollars being spent on the wrong stuff. He is slated to be kicked upstairs, and out of the way.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/21/washington/21military.html?th&emc=th
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/coin-threat-to-transformation.html
At first blush, it appeared to me that “Full Spectrum Operations” was a return to some form of sanity within the Pentagon. While I have the greatest respect for Defense Secretary Gates, the Dark Forces Within the Pentagon’s bowels (certainly no higher) conduct Psychological Preparation of the (Political) Battlefield to support a “Cut and Run” from Iraq, and abandon the Iraqi people to the same fate we let the Vietnamese face.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/gates-paradigm-full-spectrum-warfare.html
They are preparing for an incoming administration dedicated to the same “Anti-War” posture that led to the Killing Fields. And, at the same time, preserve Modular Madness, Rotational Warfare, and the Fantasy Combat System – all Neo-Con dream states.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/armys-fantasy-combat-system-fcs.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/knives-in-gun-fights-not-good-idea.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/quadrennial-defense-rubbish.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/square-triangular-and-modular-madness.html
The billions being spent on Army Transformation are focused on an imaginary battlefield originally designed in the Fifties for a so-called “Nuclear Battlefield” while USAF airplanes fall out of the sky, and the Navy creates an imaginary “Thousand Ship Fleet” based on the presumption that our allies will rally to our cause when the Chinese decide to seize their designated defense perimeters which include the Philippines and Japan.
It is hard for me to imagine a national military command structure so inept that it’s abolition seems to be the only rational course left. This is to say that the law that created the Department of Defense be repealed, and start over. While we have won more battles that before WW2, it is likely that the increased size and operations of the services accounts for that. Despite more victorious troops, our record for winning wars has gone into the toilet. Which is where DoD needs to go.
Or, maybe there are some serious Philbys in there.
Monday, January 21, 2008
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Of Butter Bars and Stripes
I wore tracks on my collar during the days of when we fought Victor Charlie in jungle and rubber. On tracks I rode, on Thunder Road, named not after Robert Mitchum’s story of running moonshine on Kentucky roads, but of exploding mines made from unexploded bombs, and artillery rounds. A lot of this comes to mind as I watch the detailed accounts of combats in Iraq, and Afghanistan. But there are some really big differences I note.
The biggest is that of the extraordinary competence of the Non Commissioned Officer Corps. Of missions they routinely carry out with expertise unheard of in the “old” Lifer-Draftee army. We never trusted a sergeant to do anything outside the range of an officer which downgraded the Butter Bar to do sergeants work without the experience with troop handling that sergeants with time under their belts. It was demeaning and counter-productive.
We ran out of experienced Noncoms early in the war, as by 1961, the WW2 veterans reached the twenty year mark, and emptied the mid ranks of Noncom as they filled the First Sergeant jobs, for which they had not trained. To fill the void, a program was instilled, called the “Shake and Bake” program to take enlisted direct from Advanced Individual Training into a NCO academy. Successful conclusion gave the graduate the rank of E-5. After the dust had settled, studies found that half were damn good, the other half was over-paid.
The NCO training that was built to meet an emergency grew and matured into the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) which has produced the best Noncoms in the world. It is because of this, that our troops are so damn good. I am constantly amazed at the degree of detailed knowledge and competence I see on the small screen from what I see against over thirty years of experience. The talking head in front is a distraction, so listen to what the sergeant says.
To back the development of Noncom competence, the Army lifted a training system from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) that we eventually called the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). BTMS stressed a collective action oriented training mode which insisted that, during breaks in the battle, the Noncom would conduct “hip pocket” instructions that he believe his squad or platoon’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) needed to practice.
I am concerned over maintaining the competence of the NCO corps in the face of the return of the Training Cycle.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/dumbing-down-force-rotational-training.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/concurrent-and-networked-training-cure.html
Another thing that concerns me is that these magnificent sergeants, including those the Marine Corps calls “the Strategic Sergeant”, are being committed outside the range of both radio and fire support. That’s something that the uneducated OJT officer corps of Vietnam never would do. Two to five minutes is more than enough to get 155mm on the way, with mortars filling the wait. It’s a bad idea to send troops into Indian country without eyes in the sky carrying a minigun and maybe some rockets. Something’s not right here.
I also don’t see the grab and pile on tactics developed in Vietnam for Air Cavalry or Leg Infantry riding into hot LZ’s on Slicks with Guns covering the flanks. I don’t see the Air Cavalry role of reconnaissance by force being used by forces with plenty of Cobras, Apaches, and Blackhawks.
The basic tactic of air cavalry we used was to nose around with grunts on the ground or a “Pink Team” made up of a Cobra and an OH-6. The idea was to get a reaction from the bad guys, hold on and pile on. The Air Cavalry Squadron had an infantry platoon, called the “Blues” ready to drop in and join battle. Ordinarily, an infantry generated contact was similarly treated with forces on strip alert or close to a landing zone for pick up. A shot fired at or by a squad at noon could be answered by two or more companies by dusk.
I hear the cry of collateral damage to explain away not using artillery, justifying the cut in guns in direct support of troops in contact by reliance on precision munitions which aren’t available when you need them and upon air strikes dependant upon the approval of CinCWorld to fire. I love the Air Force with their Nape, Snakes, and Nails. But they aren’t responsiveness for those caught in the killing zone.
There’s a break in the chain somewhere/
The biggest is that of the extraordinary competence of the Non Commissioned Officer Corps. Of missions they routinely carry out with expertise unheard of in the “old” Lifer-Draftee army. We never trusted a sergeant to do anything outside the range of an officer which downgraded the Butter Bar to do sergeants work without the experience with troop handling that sergeants with time under their belts. It was demeaning and counter-productive.
We ran out of experienced Noncoms early in the war, as by 1961, the WW2 veterans reached the twenty year mark, and emptied the mid ranks of Noncom as they filled the First Sergeant jobs, for which they had not trained. To fill the void, a program was instilled, called the “Shake and Bake” program to take enlisted direct from Advanced Individual Training into a NCO academy. Successful conclusion gave the graduate the rank of E-5. After the dust had settled, studies found that half were damn good, the other half was over-paid.
The NCO training that was built to meet an emergency grew and matured into the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) which has produced the best Noncoms in the world. It is because of this, that our troops are so damn good. I am constantly amazed at the degree of detailed knowledge and competence I see on the small screen from what I see against over thirty years of experience. The talking head in front is a distraction, so listen to what the sergeant says.
To back the development of Noncom competence, the Army lifted a training system from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) that we eventually called the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). BTMS stressed a collective action oriented training mode which insisted that, during breaks in the battle, the Noncom would conduct “hip pocket” instructions that he believe his squad or platoon’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) needed to practice.
I am concerned over maintaining the competence of the NCO corps in the face of the return of the Training Cycle.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/dumbing-down-force-rotational-training.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/12/concurrent-and-networked-training-cure.html
Another thing that concerns me is that these magnificent sergeants, including those the Marine Corps calls “the Strategic Sergeant”, are being committed outside the range of both radio and fire support. That’s something that the uneducated OJT officer corps of Vietnam never would do. Two to five minutes is more than enough to get 155mm on the way, with mortars filling the wait. It’s a bad idea to send troops into Indian country without eyes in the sky carrying a minigun and maybe some rockets. Something’s not right here.
I also don’t see the grab and pile on tactics developed in Vietnam for Air Cavalry or Leg Infantry riding into hot LZ’s on Slicks with Guns covering the flanks. I don’t see the Air Cavalry role of reconnaissance by force being used by forces with plenty of Cobras, Apaches, and Blackhawks.
The basic tactic of air cavalry we used was to nose around with grunts on the ground or a “Pink Team” made up of a Cobra and an OH-6. The idea was to get a reaction from the bad guys, hold on and pile on. The Air Cavalry Squadron had an infantry platoon, called the “Blues” ready to drop in and join battle. Ordinarily, an infantry generated contact was similarly treated with forces on strip alert or close to a landing zone for pick up. A shot fired at or by a squad at noon could be answered by two or more companies by dusk.
I hear the cry of collateral damage to explain away not using artillery, justifying the cut in guns in direct support of troops in contact by reliance on precision munitions which aren’t available when you need them and upon air strikes dependant upon the approval of CinCWorld to fire. I love the Air Force with their Nape, Snakes, and Nails. But they aren’t responsiveness for those caught in the killing zone.
There’s a break in the chain somewhere/
Monday, January 7, 2008
The Operational Artless
The shift in using the Guard and Reserves from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve suggests that the Guard and Reserves (RC) will operate without a strategy. It begs the question as to what exactly are meanings of strategy and operations mean, at least to the Pentagon.
In the halcyon days of wars between nations, where politics and warfare were considered to follow one after the other, there was an implied hierarchy between tactics and strategy with something called the “operational level” of warfare. This latter was made popular during the era of “AirLand Battle” which emphasized the movement of large units on a grand scale. It raised the view of battle from taking the next hill to doing what comes after. Jackson’s Valley campaign, the 1940 invasion of France, Patton’s breakout from Normandy and the maneuvers of Napoleon were classic examples of bold maneuver and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the best example of the operational art.
Understood in this paradigm is the notion that strategy dictates the operational art which, in turn, dictates the tactics and techniques use at the cutting edge of the force. In this paradigm, the guns move first in tactics, while trucks (ammo and fuel) move first in the operational art as in the “Hail Mary” of Desert Storm. As used, the operational art was centered on the movement of divisions within a corps, and on corps operations itself. Under the Abrams Doctrine, the bulk of the “trucks” and a good slice of the big guns were in the RC, and as an unintended consequence, the expertise of the operational art shifted to the RC, leaving the Active Army the run of the tactical level, and little sense of how and where the ammo, gas, repairs, and trucks were coming from.
This begs the question of the meaning of a shift from strategic to operational levels as the strategy for war included both operational and tactical operations and organization. As Transformation has sunk it’s claws into the military, operations have, until FM 3-24 was published consisted of rotations of units from Festung Kansas to the Eastern Front, and back without regard to any scheme of maneuver as any decent example of the operational art or strategy would have.
The establishment of modular support brigades for the Army Reserve fits the overall notion of “plug and play” but this concept that logistics isn’t modular, but systems and functionally organized and vertically oriented such as the flow of gas, ammo, repairs, and transportation. Putting a support brigade in a divisional task force doesn’t deal with anything until linked to a chain going all the way back to depots, arsenals and factories.
Under Army doctrine from WW2 until now, ammo was delivered from containers stateside to a Corps Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) where it was loaded on trucks (or trailers) for delivery to the guns. It was called throughput. The default rate of delivery was ten tons of ammo per gun per day.
Trucks hauling ammo require fuel and repairs enroute. The roads they need, need to be built and maintained, and traffic control exercised. Movement Control Centers (MCC) and Material Management Centers (MMC) coordinated the effort from rear to front. Rear Operations Centers (RAOC) managed the security of the routes along with Military Police Brigades. Early reports from Iraq suggested that little management or movement or materials were in effect as contractors unfamiliar with the totality of combat service support replaced the trained RC structure.
It might be useful to note that, hierarchically speaking, strategy dictates the operational level of war which in turn dictates the tactical level. Shifting the RC from “strategic” to “operational” has meant operating without a strategy.
There is a powerful and long standing offensive being waged from within the Pentagon to complete the process of modularization, so long standing that it has been several complete rotations of senior military officers and of political appointees through the Pentagon. This suggests that the force behind Transformation is civil service and/or industry oriented.
The Air Force and Navy is being subjected to policies focused on personnel that are consistent with the Army’s. The effects appear to be the same on the support structures of those services. The operational art without the art.
.
In the halcyon days of wars between nations, where politics and warfare were considered to follow one after the other, there was an implied hierarchy between tactics and strategy with something called the “operational level” of warfare. This latter was made popular during the era of “AirLand Battle” which emphasized the movement of large units on a grand scale. It raised the view of battle from taking the next hill to doing what comes after. Jackson’s Valley campaign, the 1940 invasion of France, Patton’s breakout from Normandy and the maneuvers of Napoleon were classic examples of bold maneuver and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the best example of the operational art.
Understood in this paradigm is the notion that strategy dictates the operational art which, in turn, dictates the tactics and techniques use at the cutting edge of the force. In this paradigm, the guns move first in tactics, while trucks (ammo and fuel) move first in the operational art as in the “Hail Mary” of Desert Storm. As used, the operational art was centered on the movement of divisions within a corps, and on corps operations itself. Under the Abrams Doctrine, the bulk of the “trucks” and a good slice of the big guns were in the RC, and as an unintended consequence, the expertise of the operational art shifted to the RC, leaving the Active Army the run of the tactical level, and little sense of how and where the ammo, gas, repairs, and trucks were coming from.
This begs the question of the meaning of a shift from strategic to operational levels as the strategy for war included both operational and tactical operations and organization. As Transformation has sunk it’s claws into the military, operations have, until FM 3-24 was published consisted of rotations of units from Festung Kansas to the Eastern Front, and back without regard to any scheme of maneuver as any decent example of the operational art or strategy would have.
The establishment of modular support brigades for the Army Reserve fits the overall notion of “plug and play” but this concept that logistics isn’t modular, but systems and functionally organized and vertically oriented such as the flow of gas, ammo, repairs, and transportation. Putting a support brigade in a divisional task force doesn’t deal with anything until linked to a chain going all the way back to depots, arsenals and factories.
Under Army doctrine from WW2 until now, ammo was delivered from containers stateside to a Corps Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) where it was loaded on trucks (or trailers) for delivery to the guns. It was called throughput. The default rate of delivery was ten tons of ammo per gun per day.
Trucks hauling ammo require fuel and repairs enroute. The roads they need, need to be built and maintained, and traffic control exercised. Movement Control Centers (MCC) and Material Management Centers (MMC) coordinated the effort from rear to front. Rear Operations Centers (RAOC) managed the security of the routes along with Military Police Brigades. Early reports from Iraq suggested that little management or movement or materials were in effect as contractors unfamiliar with the totality of combat service support replaced the trained RC structure.
It might be useful to note that, hierarchically speaking, strategy dictates the operational level of war which in turn dictates the tactical level. Shifting the RC from “strategic” to “operational” has meant operating without a strategy.
There is a powerful and long standing offensive being waged from within the Pentagon to complete the process of modularization, so long standing that it has been several complete rotations of senior military officers and of political appointees through the Pentagon. This suggests that the force behind Transformation is civil service and/or industry oriented.
The Air Force and Navy is being subjected to policies focused on personnel that are consistent with the Army’s. The effects appear to be the same on the support structures of those services. The operational art without the art.
.
Sunday, December 30, 2007
The Army's Fantasy Combat System (FCS)
A mega-billion dollars are being spent for the Army’s FCS (Fantasy Combat Systems) equipped BCTs (Modular Brigade Combat Teams). The Army has been disassembling the Field Army, Corps, and Division structure into Modular BCTs and privatizing or civilianizing the combat support and combat service support that feeds, fuels, fixes, and moves the combat units. Watch the Military Channel for details the Pentagon wants you to see.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/11/civil-service-generals-to-replace-real.html.
This concept is being developed without regard to the shape of the battlefield in terms of the mission, enemy and terrain, but solely with regard to what troops they want to field, in short order and with the hottest technology money can buy. As such it is strategically, operationally, and tactically unsound in theory and disregarded by the troops in the field.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/why-need-regulars-when-blackwater-is_31.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/knives-in-gun-fights-not-good-idea.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/tail-of-teeth.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/quadrennial-defense-rubbish.html
In short, the Modular brigade (Infantry, Airborne, and Heavy) have two maneuver battalions according to published sources. The Stryker brigade has three maneuver battalions, which is the traditional minimum. I have heard of efforts to add a third maneuver battalion to the other types.
Three subordinate maneuver elements at any maneuver unit level, from platoon to field army is considered the minimum for effective operations given the default deployment of two units forward, and one in reserve. Should the third element be transferred elsewhere, it is standard practice to form a reserve from within existing resources.
This usually means taking at least two sub elements two levels down, one from each unit, to form the reserve. At battalion, this means that a reserve of two platoons is put under battalion control reinforced by elements of the headquarters company, often the recon platoon. This deployment weakens the flexibility of the lower units.
This form of detachment and attachment is part and parcel of what is called “task organization” and depends also on what the mission, enemy and terrain allows. In addition, maneuver elements are deployed on the avenues of approach that favors their type. We call that “infantry in the green, tanks in the white” alluding to the colors used on a map to denote woods versus open fields.
Likewise the shape of the little brown lines that show the shape of the land impacts on the allocation of troops. Lay your hand on a flat surface and note the five types of terrain: fingers, ridges on the fingers, valleys between the fingers, hilltops on the knuckles, and between the knuckles are passes. The fifth type of terrain is a hole in the ground which you get by doing the “A-Ok” sign
There are five ways to cross the terrain:
1. Cross corridor – across the ridges and valleys (cross finger)
2. High ground – up the finger
3. Low ground – up the space between the fingers.
4. Through the Pass – between the knuckles.
5. Running from peak to peak- across the knuckles on highest ground. (Korea)
There are three kinds of slopes on the hand:
1. Flat – on the table
2. Convex – Palm down, hand curled
3. Concave – Palm up, hand curled.
Against movement fires are applied to deny the enemy to move any of the five ways. Fires are classified in two ways:
1. Grazing – flat across relatively level terrain.
2. Plunging – It’s convex
The trick is to use grazing fires from knuckles down the fingers and sides of fingers and to the rear across the back of the hand. Plunging fires are used in the valleys controlled from the knuckles.
The tricky part of terrain analysis is to match green and white to the hands above to determine what used to be called COCOA:
1. Critical terrain – knuckles that can fire on lines of communication or maneuver as above.
2. Observation – where you can see and control fires – knuckles also
3. Cover and Concealment – Use valleys out of the line of sight of knuckles and the use of lots of green.
4. Obstacles: Wiggly brown lines bunched up to show steepness, water (put hand in a half inch of water and you get the idea), or some serious green stuff.
5. Avenues of approach – That which you can use to approach critical terrain at maximum speed and/or survivability. Green for the infantry, white of the tanks.
Principles of ground combat, the 4 F’s
1. Find them
2. Fix them
3. Fight them
4. Follow up
The fix and fight parts are also called fire and maneuver – fires are used to “fix” or pin down the enemy, while maneuver elements close with the enemy to destroy the force and/or secure the terrain. Rommel and Patton both said it was “hold them by the nose and kick them in the ass”.
The Modular brigade, according to the dogma passed out to the military public is task organized by Table of Organization (TOE) without regard to the niceties of handy tactics. It was sold as a way to save deployment time by cutting out the task organization time to meet mission, enemy or terrain. Fortunately, no one outside the Transformation process is that dumb, not even Regulars. In fact, if someone were to tell a combat commander in Iraq not to change the task organization, that someone would either be committed or incarcerated.
FCS is sold and the “Future” combat system, and is based on supporting and enabling the modular brigade in an imaginary battlefield not known in current military writings, past experience, or history, hence the nickname “Fantasy Combat System”. To the extent that FCS is based on the eventuality of the Fantasy battle, the entire budget is about the same as whizzing in the wind.
Fortunately, while the Whitehalls, Kremlins, and Pentagons of the world are normally wrong on the shape of things to come, the troops will take what they get and make it work in ways not envisioned by higher ups:
The USAAF didn’t want radial engines in their fighters, unlike the Navy, but found the P-47 more than useful, The USAAF built the B-17 to sink battleships which they couldn’t hit, but proved to be a great smasher of cities, factories, and lines of communication. The P-39 rear engine fighter was Zero bait, but the Soviets used it as a great ground attack fighter.
Both the M113 and the UH-1 started out as ambulances for the Medical Corps. The M-16 was rejected by the Army in favor of the M-14. Army Aviation insisted that helicopters should not be armed for air-to-air combat until the Hind showed up.
Of the elements of the FCS that is hyped as the wave of the future, the networked command and control system is not dependent on the task organization of troops in the field. Likewise, precision guided munitions isn’ t exactly new.
The highly touted UGS (unattended ground systems) were fielded in Vietnam and was responsible for effective targeting of the NVA in the siege of Khe Sanh, every move they made was telegraphed to targeting cells who unleashed waves of B-52’s. Chopper Pilots told me that they preferred to go over 2.000 feet to avoid the smell of death. I taught the use of UGS at Ft, Huachuca in early Seventies, and was dismayed that the testing at Ft Hood of the system couldn’t figure out how to use them and they were dropped from the Army inventory.
Go figure
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/11/civil-service-generals-to-replace-real.html.
This concept is being developed without regard to the shape of the battlefield in terms of the mission, enemy and terrain, but solely with regard to what troops they want to field, in short order and with the hottest technology money can buy. As such it is strategically, operationally, and tactically unsound in theory and disregarded by the troops in the field.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/why-need-regulars-when-blackwater-is_31.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/knives-in-gun-fights-not-good-idea.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/tail-of-teeth.html
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/quadrennial-defense-rubbish.html
In short, the Modular brigade (Infantry, Airborne, and Heavy) have two maneuver battalions according to published sources. The Stryker brigade has three maneuver battalions, which is the traditional minimum. I have heard of efforts to add a third maneuver battalion to the other types.
Three subordinate maneuver elements at any maneuver unit level, from platoon to field army is considered the minimum for effective operations given the default deployment of two units forward, and one in reserve. Should the third element be transferred elsewhere, it is standard practice to form a reserve from within existing resources.
This usually means taking at least two sub elements two levels down, one from each unit, to form the reserve. At battalion, this means that a reserve of two platoons is put under battalion control reinforced by elements of the headquarters company, often the recon platoon. This deployment weakens the flexibility of the lower units.
This form of detachment and attachment is part and parcel of what is called “task organization” and depends also on what the mission, enemy and terrain allows. In addition, maneuver elements are deployed on the avenues of approach that favors their type. We call that “infantry in the green, tanks in the white” alluding to the colors used on a map to denote woods versus open fields.
Likewise the shape of the little brown lines that show the shape of the land impacts on the allocation of troops. Lay your hand on a flat surface and note the five types of terrain: fingers, ridges on the fingers, valleys between the fingers, hilltops on the knuckles, and between the knuckles are passes. The fifth type of terrain is a hole in the ground which you get by doing the “A-Ok” sign
There are five ways to cross the terrain:
1. Cross corridor – across the ridges and valleys (cross finger)
2. High ground – up the finger
3. Low ground – up the space between the fingers.
4. Through the Pass – between the knuckles.
5. Running from peak to peak- across the knuckles on highest ground. (Korea)
There are three kinds of slopes on the hand:
1. Flat – on the table
2. Convex – Palm down, hand curled
3. Concave – Palm up, hand curled.
Against movement fires are applied to deny the enemy to move any of the five ways. Fires are classified in two ways:
1. Grazing – flat across relatively level terrain.
2. Plunging – It’s convex
The trick is to use grazing fires from knuckles down the fingers and sides of fingers and to the rear across the back of the hand. Plunging fires are used in the valleys controlled from the knuckles.
The tricky part of terrain analysis is to match green and white to the hands above to determine what used to be called COCOA:
1. Critical terrain – knuckles that can fire on lines of communication or maneuver as above.
2. Observation – where you can see and control fires – knuckles also
3. Cover and Concealment – Use valleys out of the line of sight of knuckles and the use of lots of green.
4. Obstacles: Wiggly brown lines bunched up to show steepness, water (put hand in a half inch of water and you get the idea), or some serious green stuff.
5. Avenues of approach – That which you can use to approach critical terrain at maximum speed and/or survivability. Green for the infantry, white of the tanks.
Principles of ground combat, the 4 F’s
1. Find them
2. Fix them
3. Fight them
4. Follow up
The fix and fight parts are also called fire and maneuver – fires are used to “fix” or pin down the enemy, while maneuver elements close with the enemy to destroy the force and/or secure the terrain. Rommel and Patton both said it was “hold them by the nose and kick them in the ass”.
The Modular brigade, according to the dogma passed out to the military public is task organized by Table of Organization (TOE) without regard to the niceties of handy tactics. It was sold as a way to save deployment time by cutting out the task organization time to meet mission, enemy or terrain. Fortunately, no one outside the Transformation process is that dumb, not even Regulars. In fact, if someone were to tell a combat commander in Iraq not to change the task organization, that someone would either be committed or incarcerated.
FCS is sold and the “Future” combat system, and is based on supporting and enabling the modular brigade in an imaginary battlefield not known in current military writings, past experience, or history, hence the nickname “Fantasy Combat System”. To the extent that FCS is based on the eventuality of the Fantasy battle, the entire budget is about the same as whizzing in the wind.
Fortunately, while the Whitehalls, Kremlins, and Pentagons of the world are normally wrong on the shape of things to come, the troops will take what they get and make it work in ways not envisioned by higher ups:
The USAAF didn’t want radial engines in their fighters, unlike the Navy, but found the P-47 more than useful, The USAAF built the B-17 to sink battleships which they couldn’t hit, but proved to be a great smasher of cities, factories, and lines of communication. The P-39 rear engine fighter was Zero bait, but the Soviets used it as a great ground attack fighter.
Both the M113 and the UH-1 started out as ambulances for the Medical Corps. The M-16 was rejected by the Army in favor of the M-14. Army Aviation insisted that helicopters should not be armed for air-to-air combat until the Hind showed up.
Of the elements of the FCS that is hyped as the wave of the future, the networked command and control system is not dependent on the task organization of troops in the field. Likewise, precision guided munitions isn’ t exactly new.
The highly touted UGS (unattended ground systems) were fielded in Vietnam and was responsible for effective targeting of the NVA in the siege of Khe Sanh, every move they made was telegraphed to targeting cells who unleashed waves of B-52’s. Chopper Pilots told me that they preferred to go over 2.000 feet to avoid the smell of death. I taught the use of UGS at Ft, Huachuca in early Seventies, and was dismayed that the testing at Ft Hood of the system couldn’t figure out how to use them and they were dropped from the Army inventory.
Go figure
Friday, December 28, 2007
A Cadre Defense
Against that day when the big balloon goes up, where the forward deployed forces have been shredded as have the grand plans from inside the magical Beltway, a backup military establishment with industry to match would be nice to have. The principal principle against that day is to follow Bedford Forrest’s dictum – “get thar fustest with the mostest!” – in short be able to muster the talent on hand, that which takes the longest lead time to develop, up and running rapidly.
The long lead time items include the larger capital ships like heavy cruisers, carriers, and Fancy Dan fighters. It includes investing in R&D, more pure than applied. And, most of all it means preserving the combat experience and military training of those who have served. Our current personnel policies are wasteful and wanting in this regard, tossing the trained to the wolves with disdainful regard, then when the fit hits the shan, searching the bottom of the barrel.
Long lead people are the noncoms, specialists, and officers with experience, of two to five or more years. It is in the initial four or five years of service that is the investment, the grounding and framework of the experienced fighter. In peacetime service, the majority of souls serve without being in the fleet or in the field, but in jobs tangentially related to core tasks, after their core service.
Since the most numerous of trooper is at the bottom, and the time to train up to entry level service is short range, a defense establishment prepared for the long haul, should focus on the skills, knowledge, and attitudes of the mid level enlisted and officer. One old training policy of days gone by, and also adopted by the German Army of between Great Wars was a skinny chain of command with lateral expansion of the command on paper, and with those serving at one level trained to operate at two levels higher. In this manner, the German Army could expand from a force of 100,000 to several millions of well led troops in short order.
The Germans and Soviets also instituted training in military skills in their youth groups like the Hitler Youth, Komsomol, and the Young Pioneers who trained the youth in political action, and, some military training, and skills needed for military operations. The Boy Scout movement was started by Lord Baden-Powell to maintain a skill base capable of skilled military use. The term “scout” is a military role requiring more than the average level of outdoorsy skills. Our CAP and Sea Cadets follow in this role, without the political clap trap.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baden-Powell)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hitler_Youth)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Pioneers), (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komsomol)
The merit badge approach of short courses for veterans who wish only to keep their skills up to snuff, could be crafted to include marksmanship, paint ball competitions, military communications exercises, and a whole host of “fun” things to do to maintain a skill base, and to keep tabs on those we may need.
The military structure of forces not on active service should include, as today, units ready to rock and roll on the drop of the hat. This was the intent of the Capstone program which facilitated the fantastic rise in military competence of American Arms in peacetime ever. It had the down side of presenting the Congress with a fully capable military establishment at one third to one sixth the cost of an equivalent Active force.
Recent experience has proven that despite Pentagon assurances (and Federal Law) the Pentagon never really intended to call up trained units as such. From the start, given Defense Officers Management Act, the Pentagon as a replacement depot and to be kept in a separate pile from the Active service to facilitate post conflict reductions in force without resorting to RIF or the UP/Out promotion system. That provision of Law that required units to be called as such seems to have disappeared in a reshuffle of the law for administrative reasons, and needs to be reissued by the Congress.
It, however, must be recognized that under existing laws and plans, there is no systemic method of providing trained mid career personnel to replace losses and start new units except by cannibalization of existing units of all components. It is in the regard that a new division of labor between the components be drawn. Active forces must be geared to the most exigent of circumstances, particularly from foreign sources. The National Guard has a dual mission, of state and federal requirements. The Guard is the default national defense force for war, courtesy of the Second Amendment. And it has been the back bone of our national wars up through WW2.
The Reserves (USAR, USNR, USAFR, etc) were initially Federal Forces raised for the duration of a war. As such they were known as “US Volunteers” which included the famed “Rough Riders” After WW1, Reserve forces were developed to preserve certain skills and provide a pool of qualified individuals for service. After WW2, the Reserves were organized into field units such as Corps and Divisions, but after Vietnam, the structure was integrated into specific war scenarios called contingencies.
But these structures did not provide for replacements for extant units of any component. In this regard, the Reserves as opposed to the Guard have the capabilities to maintain replacements for any component. The only program in existence that met the criterion were non-pay mobilization units of those interested in keeping a hand in but generally consisted of lectures by individual members. The IRR, once considered a ready pool of replacements, proved to provide a third of those listed. Clearly, the need for small detachment and individual replacements for all components be made ready with such incentives in pay and challenge to keep those not in units.
The technology of the computer supported CPX can allow units without equipment to train in realistic environments with the clear expectation that they could be called as individuals or as the nexus of a whole new unit. A battalion consisting of a staff and part of a chain of command could be filled with entry level personnel and replacement from any component and made ready to deploy in short order.
What takes time in the development of a deployment ready unit is it’s chain of command, and not in the lowest level who consist of those who can be raised and trained in less than a year. It is time to re-institute cadre units.
The long lead time items include the larger capital ships like heavy cruisers, carriers, and Fancy Dan fighters. It includes investing in R&D, more pure than applied. And, most of all it means preserving the combat experience and military training of those who have served. Our current personnel policies are wasteful and wanting in this regard, tossing the trained to the wolves with disdainful regard, then when the fit hits the shan, searching the bottom of the barrel.
Long lead people are the noncoms, specialists, and officers with experience, of two to five or more years. It is in the initial four or five years of service that is the investment, the grounding and framework of the experienced fighter. In peacetime service, the majority of souls serve without being in the fleet or in the field, but in jobs tangentially related to core tasks, after their core service.
Since the most numerous of trooper is at the bottom, and the time to train up to entry level service is short range, a defense establishment prepared for the long haul, should focus on the skills, knowledge, and attitudes of the mid level enlisted and officer. One old training policy of days gone by, and also adopted by the German Army of between Great Wars was a skinny chain of command with lateral expansion of the command on paper, and with those serving at one level trained to operate at two levels higher. In this manner, the German Army could expand from a force of 100,000 to several millions of well led troops in short order.
The Germans and Soviets also instituted training in military skills in their youth groups like the Hitler Youth, Komsomol, and the Young Pioneers who trained the youth in political action, and, some military training, and skills needed for military operations. The Boy Scout movement was started by Lord Baden-Powell to maintain a skill base capable of skilled military use. The term “scout” is a military role requiring more than the average level of outdoorsy skills. Our CAP and Sea Cadets follow in this role, without the political clap trap.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baden-Powell)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hitler_Youth)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Pioneers), (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komsomol)
The merit badge approach of short courses for veterans who wish only to keep their skills up to snuff, could be crafted to include marksmanship, paint ball competitions, military communications exercises, and a whole host of “fun” things to do to maintain a skill base, and to keep tabs on those we may need.
The military structure of forces not on active service should include, as today, units ready to rock and roll on the drop of the hat. This was the intent of the Capstone program which facilitated the fantastic rise in military competence of American Arms in peacetime ever. It had the down side of presenting the Congress with a fully capable military establishment at one third to one sixth the cost of an equivalent Active force.
Recent experience has proven that despite Pentagon assurances (and Federal Law) the Pentagon never really intended to call up trained units as such. From the start, given Defense Officers Management Act, the Pentagon as a replacement depot and to be kept in a separate pile from the Active service to facilitate post conflict reductions in force without resorting to RIF or the UP/Out promotion system. That provision of Law that required units to be called as such seems to have disappeared in a reshuffle of the law for administrative reasons, and needs to be reissued by the Congress.
It, however, must be recognized that under existing laws and plans, there is no systemic method of providing trained mid career personnel to replace losses and start new units except by cannibalization of existing units of all components. It is in the regard that a new division of labor between the components be drawn. Active forces must be geared to the most exigent of circumstances, particularly from foreign sources. The National Guard has a dual mission, of state and federal requirements. The Guard is the default national defense force for war, courtesy of the Second Amendment. And it has been the back bone of our national wars up through WW2.
The Reserves (USAR, USNR, USAFR, etc) were initially Federal Forces raised for the duration of a war. As such they were known as “US Volunteers” which included the famed “Rough Riders” After WW1, Reserve forces were developed to preserve certain skills and provide a pool of qualified individuals for service. After WW2, the Reserves were organized into field units such as Corps and Divisions, but after Vietnam, the structure was integrated into specific war scenarios called contingencies.
But these structures did not provide for replacements for extant units of any component. In this regard, the Reserves as opposed to the Guard have the capabilities to maintain replacements for any component. The only program in existence that met the criterion were non-pay mobilization units of those interested in keeping a hand in but generally consisted of lectures by individual members. The IRR, once considered a ready pool of replacements, proved to provide a third of those listed. Clearly, the need for small detachment and individual replacements for all components be made ready with such incentives in pay and challenge to keep those not in units.
The technology of the computer supported CPX can allow units without equipment to train in realistic environments with the clear expectation that they could be called as individuals or as the nexus of a whole new unit. A battalion consisting of a staff and part of a chain of command could be filled with entry level personnel and replacement from any component and made ready to deploy in short order.
What takes time in the development of a deployment ready unit is it’s chain of command, and not in the lowest level who consist of those who can be raised and trained in less than a year. It is time to re-institute cadre units.
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Full Mobilization - A Meritorious Approach
Once or twice a century, a nation has to fight for its life, where old men and boys are pressed into service to fight an invading force. Often the borders of the nation have been pierced and much of the homeland is occupied by the enemy. This is the scenario where at least ten percent of the total population is under arms and three or four times as many are in war industries. It is against this possibility that the base for this expansion must be laid in peacetime.
That which is more precious than gold, is the combat experience of previous wars as well as those with extensive training in the military arts. Traditional reserve structures have tried to maintain lists of those needed for the direst of emergencies, but in modern more mobile populations, the list becomes useless. Nevertheless those with experience exist. It is this population that mobilization planners must provide for with law and military order to gather the trained and experienced into the forces whether the individuals want to or not.
For the willing, traditional mobilization designee and unit training exist, but often many times the numbers so employed have no slots or choose the focus on their civilian careers. To encourage those without slots to fill, a new type of participation not dependent on slots but upon individual and collective training available without regard to career, but to preserve the skill base should be developed. Call it the “merit badge” approach, where sets of skills and a badge, or certificate is granted in recognition of completion. Such could be built around marksmanship, land navigation, telecommunications, command post duty, etc. Pay could be applied or not.
To provide for the mobilization of anyone who knows one end of a rifle from the other, the enlistment contract should be amended to provide for a life time commitment. Officers and retirees already have this stipulation. The government owns you until buried.
Mobilization planners should also develop mechanisms for the mobilization of segments of industry and commerce which have military applicability with minor military training needed. This is what happened in WW2 where hospitals and construction firms were brought into military service.
With a few exceptions, those organizations providing support for our troops overseas should be militarized and brought under the UCMJ. The form of their militarization would not necessarily be the career intensive model for the current military components, active or reserve, but designed for the duration. Raising these organizations could be under the initial administration of a state governor, or of a corporation, or the federal government itself. Once certified, the organization would be mustered into the services. The pay could be direct from the US government or through the original establishing organization as determined by the government.
This approach is not any different that which we used prior to WW1. Since the Pentagon has chosen to abandon the last one hundred years of military development, it is appropriate to take what worked before and up date it. It is also unlikely that the Pentagon could develop anything so threatening to their cookie jar, that it would be incumbent on the Congress to do so, as that is their specified power given in the Constitution. And that brings it back to whoever is reading this tome.
That which is more precious than gold, is the combat experience of previous wars as well as those with extensive training in the military arts. Traditional reserve structures have tried to maintain lists of those needed for the direst of emergencies, but in modern more mobile populations, the list becomes useless. Nevertheless those with experience exist. It is this population that mobilization planners must provide for with law and military order to gather the trained and experienced into the forces whether the individuals want to or not.
For the willing, traditional mobilization designee and unit training exist, but often many times the numbers so employed have no slots or choose the focus on their civilian careers. To encourage those without slots to fill, a new type of participation not dependent on slots but upon individual and collective training available without regard to career, but to preserve the skill base should be developed. Call it the “merit badge” approach, where sets of skills and a badge, or certificate is granted in recognition of completion. Such could be built around marksmanship, land navigation, telecommunications, command post duty, etc. Pay could be applied or not.
To provide for the mobilization of anyone who knows one end of a rifle from the other, the enlistment contract should be amended to provide for a life time commitment. Officers and retirees already have this stipulation. The government owns you until buried.
Mobilization planners should also develop mechanisms for the mobilization of segments of industry and commerce which have military applicability with minor military training needed. This is what happened in WW2 where hospitals and construction firms were brought into military service.
With a few exceptions, those organizations providing support for our troops overseas should be militarized and brought under the UCMJ. The form of their militarization would not necessarily be the career intensive model for the current military components, active or reserve, but designed for the duration. Raising these organizations could be under the initial administration of a state governor, or of a corporation, or the federal government itself. Once certified, the organization would be mustered into the services. The pay could be direct from the US government or through the original establishing organization as determined by the government.
This approach is not any different that which we used prior to WW1. Since the Pentagon has chosen to abandon the last one hundred years of military development, it is appropriate to take what worked before and up date it. It is also unlikely that the Pentagon could develop anything so threatening to their cookie jar, that it would be incumbent on the Congress to do so, as that is their specified power given in the Constitution. And that brings it back to whoever is reading this tome.
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Concurrent and Networked Training - a cure for Transformation
The return of the Training Cycle approach to training makes simplistic visual sense, as if the skills of each successive level of command from individual to Theatre were dependant upon the levels below. They are not. Each successive level of command consists of squad’s networks laterally with other squads of the same headquarters, and with other squads representing the chain of command, adjacent, and supporting commands.
The chatter between these networked squads is analogous to the flow of electrical charges through a nervous system, the nervous system that ties the eyes, ears, legs, stomach, heart, stomach and brain of an individual. The training cycle approach starts with the feet. BTMS, the Battalion Training Management System, stressed concurrent training using the whole body, but in successively more difficult and complex tasks.
The replication of the chatter between squads is the sum and substance of the command post exercise (CPX). A well designed CPX is hard to distinguish from actual operations if that chatter is presented in the form and through the proper medium to the squads representing the exercised unit including the fog of war.
The Field Training Exercise is where the squads interface with the mud, dust, rain and (simulated) blood of warfare. In the field, they still are linked with other squads at platoon, company, battalion as well as the fire support system, supply system, and the other vertical and horizontal networks of the whole organization. The link between the squad is the radio.
Training the squad in isolation from the even the simulation of the chatter is what we used to do in the Auld Days prior to Vietnam. Rifle squads were trained in isolation from the platoon until platoon training started. Back then the legacy of the Korean War was hill-centric. Each successive levels of training were oriented around finding squad sized hills, platoon sized hills, on up to battalion and brigade sized hills. Each level used the same maneuver; base of fire pinned down the presumed enemy always on the top of the hill, while the maneuver element hit the hill from the flank.
Unbeknownst to us, the Soviets built fire traps on the flanks of their forward elements to cut up our maneuver elements.
For the last twenty or so years, innovative training has married the CPX to the FTX by using a unit going through an exercise to be linked to an ongoing CPX. This is happening at Ft Hunter Ligget in combat training of support units, and was used in a previous lifetime in large scale logistics exercises that I participated in as a member of the 75th Division then known at “The MAC’. I worked in an intelligence capacity in division, corps, corps support command, area support command, and networked medical and MP units for instance. These large exercises involved joint and combined operations with participants from other services and other nations.
The downside of these large exercises is that the RC chain of command understood more of the nuts and bolts of large unit operations than the AC chain of command as the latter were focused on Brigade and below operations done in a vacuum. The chatter between elements of combat units in contact tends to be more vertically aligned with successive levels of command. The operations orders of next higher are the prime source of information. In the FTX mode, chatter with support units such as field artillery is often ignored to the detriment of the grunt on the ground later in actual combat without fire support, beans, bullets, gas and maintenance support.
The chatter in Combat Service Support and Combat Support (CSS and CS) tends to be networked in all directions. The intelligence requirements for an intelligence unit come as much from supported and lateral “squads” as from on high. Some support is organized as a vertically oriented structure as are the delivery of gas and ammo and the evacuation of the wounded. Some are service oriented on both an area and command basis as are medical and engineer units. The exact composition of a support element depends on the mix of needs of the supported commands which result in an ad hoc mix of vertically or horizontally integrated networks unified by a common doctrine and training.
The dark side of the Abrams Doctrine was that he intended to ensure that the RC was included in the next war by shifting the logistics to them. This, however, had a serious unintended side effect. The AC forgot logistics until operations in the Balkans brought to their attention that they couldn’t rely on the Log Fairies Four (the Gas Fairy, the Truck Fairy, the Ammo Fairy, and the Fixit Fairy) in the RW as they had in their training exercises. They were devastated that the detested Weekend Warrior, the Wannabe Warrior, would actually show up in uniform wearing leaves and eagles.
Then came the end of the large scale RC CPX, the Modularization of the Army, and the substitution of military CSS and CS units with Halliburton, Custer Battles, and Blackwater. While Modularization is sold as a simpler structure, it actually creates a more complex, tricky, and uncoordinated ad hoc approach to supporting the troops than the well trained and experienced RC CSS and CS command structure.
The 75th had to develop an interim Rear Area Operations doctrine in order to train CS and CSS units. This guidance was published in an annual document to support training as
Appendix J to that document. As it was the only guidance around after Vietnam was swept under the rug, it gained some credence to the point that a copy was republished by the Command and General Staff College with their logo and the title “Appendix J – Rear Area Combat Operations” also known as RACO.
We are still losing people in Iraq and Afghanistan to attacks on our lines of communication which attacks were principal tool we used to alter the flow of chatter in a logistic organization to cause them to exercise the military decision making process to meet changes in supply and demand for their services. Our clients included not only the logistics units, but included the Engineers, Military Police, and Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC) that coordinated and protected the rear. These are the units that Rumsfeld left behind. The rest is recent history.
As an aside, the 75th also used Soviet Airborne divisions as a tool to alter the relation of supply and demand for logistics in a number of scenarios set in the Fulda and North German plains scenarios. I picked out landing zones and objectives on the Rhine and on critical terrain between the Rhine and Antwerp. Some AC colonel ridiculed our scenario, saying it was unrealistic.
I recently found out from the German Consul General that during the reunification of Germany, he was liaison to the departing Soviets and the East German military, he found out that the Soviets were going to use ten airborne divisions and on the same sites I had chosen.
Unfortunately, my bragging is no consolation for a conflict that would have ended already had the Army Reserve and National Guard had been deployed as trained and organized/
The chatter between these networked squads is analogous to the flow of electrical charges through a nervous system, the nervous system that ties the eyes, ears, legs, stomach, heart, stomach and brain of an individual. The training cycle approach starts with the feet. BTMS, the Battalion Training Management System, stressed concurrent training using the whole body, but in successively more difficult and complex tasks.
The replication of the chatter between squads is the sum and substance of the command post exercise (CPX). A well designed CPX is hard to distinguish from actual operations if that chatter is presented in the form and through the proper medium to the squads representing the exercised unit including the fog of war.
The Field Training Exercise is where the squads interface with the mud, dust, rain and (simulated) blood of warfare. In the field, they still are linked with other squads at platoon, company, battalion as well as the fire support system, supply system, and the other vertical and horizontal networks of the whole organization. The link between the squad is the radio.
Training the squad in isolation from the even the simulation of the chatter is what we used to do in the Auld Days prior to Vietnam. Rifle squads were trained in isolation from the platoon until platoon training started. Back then the legacy of the Korean War was hill-centric. Each successive levels of training were oriented around finding squad sized hills, platoon sized hills, on up to battalion and brigade sized hills. Each level used the same maneuver; base of fire pinned down the presumed enemy always on the top of the hill, while the maneuver element hit the hill from the flank.
Unbeknownst to us, the Soviets built fire traps on the flanks of their forward elements to cut up our maneuver elements.
For the last twenty or so years, innovative training has married the CPX to the FTX by using a unit going through an exercise to be linked to an ongoing CPX. This is happening at Ft Hunter Ligget in combat training of support units, and was used in a previous lifetime in large scale logistics exercises that I participated in as a member of the 75th Division then known at “The MAC’. I worked in an intelligence capacity in division, corps, corps support command, area support command, and networked medical and MP units for instance. These large exercises involved joint and combined operations with participants from other services and other nations.
The downside of these large exercises is that the RC chain of command understood more of the nuts and bolts of large unit operations than the AC chain of command as the latter were focused on Brigade and below operations done in a vacuum. The chatter between elements of combat units in contact tends to be more vertically aligned with successive levels of command. The operations orders of next higher are the prime source of information. In the FTX mode, chatter with support units such as field artillery is often ignored to the detriment of the grunt on the ground later in actual combat without fire support, beans, bullets, gas and maintenance support.
The chatter in Combat Service Support and Combat Support (CSS and CS) tends to be networked in all directions. The intelligence requirements for an intelligence unit come as much from supported and lateral “squads” as from on high. Some support is organized as a vertically oriented structure as are the delivery of gas and ammo and the evacuation of the wounded. Some are service oriented on both an area and command basis as are medical and engineer units. The exact composition of a support element depends on the mix of needs of the supported commands which result in an ad hoc mix of vertically or horizontally integrated networks unified by a common doctrine and training.
The dark side of the Abrams Doctrine was that he intended to ensure that the RC was included in the next war by shifting the logistics to them. This, however, had a serious unintended side effect. The AC forgot logistics until operations in the Balkans brought to their attention that they couldn’t rely on the Log Fairies Four (the Gas Fairy, the Truck Fairy, the Ammo Fairy, and the Fixit Fairy) in the RW as they had in their training exercises. They were devastated that the detested Weekend Warrior, the Wannabe Warrior, would actually show up in uniform wearing leaves and eagles.
Then came the end of the large scale RC CPX, the Modularization of the Army, and the substitution of military CSS and CS units with Halliburton, Custer Battles, and Blackwater. While Modularization is sold as a simpler structure, it actually creates a more complex, tricky, and uncoordinated ad hoc approach to supporting the troops than the well trained and experienced RC CSS and CS command structure.
The 75th had to develop an interim Rear Area Operations doctrine in order to train CS and CSS units. This guidance was published in an annual document to support training as
Appendix J to that document. As it was the only guidance around after Vietnam was swept under the rug, it gained some credence to the point that a copy was republished by the Command and General Staff College with their logo and the title “Appendix J – Rear Area Combat Operations” also known as RACO.
We are still losing people in Iraq and Afghanistan to attacks on our lines of communication which attacks were principal tool we used to alter the flow of chatter in a logistic organization to cause them to exercise the military decision making process to meet changes in supply and demand for their services. Our clients included not only the logistics units, but included the Engineers, Military Police, and Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC) that coordinated and protected the rear. These are the units that Rumsfeld left behind. The rest is recent history.
As an aside, the 75th also used Soviet Airborne divisions as a tool to alter the relation of supply and demand for logistics in a number of scenarios set in the Fulda and North German plains scenarios. I picked out landing zones and objectives on the Rhine and on critical terrain between the Rhine and Antwerp. Some AC colonel ridiculed our scenario, saying it was unrealistic.
I recently found out from the German Consul General that during the reunification of Germany, he was liaison to the departing Soviets and the East German military, he found out that the Soviets were going to use ten airborne divisions and on the same sites I had chosen.
Unfortunately, my bragging is no consolation for a conflict that would have ended already had the Army Reserve and National Guard had been deployed as trained and organized/
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