Sunday, December 30, 2007

The Army's Fantasy Combat System (FCS)

A mega-billion dollars are being spent for the Army’s FCS (Fantasy Combat Systems) equipped BCTs (Modular Brigade Combat Teams). The Army has been disassembling the Field Army, Corps, and Division structure into Modular BCTs and privatizing or civilianizing the combat support and combat service support that feeds, fuels, fixes, and moves the combat units. Watch the Military Channel for details the Pentagon wants you to see.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/11/civil-service-generals-to-replace-real.html.

This concept is being developed without regard to the shape of the battlefield in terms of the mission, enemy and terrain, but solely with regard to what troops they want to field, in short order and with the hottest technology money can buy. As such it is strategically, operationally, and tactically unsound in theory and disregarded by the troops in the field.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/why-need-regulars-when-blackwater-is_31.html

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/knives-in-gun-fights-not-good-idea.html

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2007/10/tail-of-teeth.html

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/quadrennial-defense-rubbish.html

In short, the Modular brigade (Infantry, Airborne, and Heavy) have two maneuver battalions according to published sources. The Stryker brigade has three maneuver battalions, which is the traditional minimum. I have heard of efforts to add a third maneuver battalion to the other types.

Three subordinate maneuver elements at any maneuver unit level, from platoon to field army is considered the minimum for effective operations given the default deployment of two units forward, and one in reserve. Should the third element be transferred elsewhere, it is standard practice to form a reserve from within existing resources.

This usually means taking at least two sub elements two levels down, one from each unit, to form the reserve. At battalion, this means that a reserve of two platoons is put under battalion control reinforced by elements of the headquarters company, often the recon platoon. This deployment weakens the flexibility of the lower units.

This form of detachment and attachment is part and parcel of what is called “task organization” and depends also on what the mission, enemy and terrain allows. In addition, maneuver elements are deployed on the avenues of approach that favors their type. We call that “infantry in the green, tanks in the white” alluding to the colors used on a map to denote woods versus open fields.

Likewise the shape of the little brown lines that show the shape of the land impacts on the allocation of troops. Lay your hand on a flat surface and note the five types of terrain: fingers, ridges on the fingers, valleys between the fingers, hilltops on the knuckles, and between the knuckles are passes. The fifth type of terrain is a hole in the ground which you get by doing the “A-Ok” sign

There are five ways to cross the terrain:
1. Cross corridor – across the ridges and valleys (cross finger)
2. High ground – up the finger
3. Low ground – up the space between the fingers.
4. Through the Pass – between the knuckles.
5. Running from peak to peak- across the knuckles on highest ground. (Korea)

There are three kinds of slopes on the hand:
1. Flat – on the table
2. Convex – Palm down, hand curled
3. Concave – Palm up, hand curled.

Against movement fires are applied to deny the enemy to move any of the five ways. Fires are classified in two ways:

1. Grazing – flat across relatively level terrain.
2. Plunging – It’s convex

The trick is to use grazing fires from knuckles down the fingers and sides of fingers and to the rear across the back of the hand. Plunging fires are used in the valleys controlled from the knuckles.

The tricky part of terrain analysis is to match green and white to the hands above to determine what used to be called COCOA:

1. Critical terrain – knuckles that can fire on lines of communication or maneuver as above.
2. Observation – where you can see and control fires – knuckles also
3. Cover and Concealment – Use valleys out of the line of sight of knuckles and the use of lots of green.
4. Obstacles: Wiggly brown lines bunched up to show steepness, water (put hand in a half inch of water and you get the idea), or some serious green stuff.
5. Avenues of approach – That which you can use to approach critical terrain at maximum speed and/or survivability. Green for the infantry, white of the tanks.

Principles of ground combat, the 4 F’s

1. Find them
2. Fix them
3. Fight them
4. Follow up

The fix and fight parts are also called fire and maneuver – fires are used to “fix” or pin down the enemy, while maneuver elements close with the enemy to destroy the force and/or secure the terrain. Rommel and Patton both said it was “hold them by the nose and kick them in the ass”.

The Modular brigade, according to the dogma passed out to the military public is task organized by Table of Organization (TOE) without regard to the niceties of handy tactics. It was sold as a way to save deployment time by cutting out the task organization time to meet mission, enemy or terrain. Fortunately, no one outside the Transformation process is that dumb, not even Regulars. In fact, if someone were to tell a combat commander in Iraq not to change the task organization, that someone would either be committed or incarcerated.

FCS is sold and the “Future” combat system, and is based on supporting and enabling the modular brigade in an imaginary battlefield not known in current military writings, past experience, or history, hence the nickname “Fantasy Combat System”. To the extent that FCS is based on the eventuality of the Fantasy battle, the entire budget is about the same as whizzing in the wind.

Fortunately, while the Whitehalls, Kremlins, and Pentagons of the world are normally wrong on the shape of things to come, the troops will take what they get and make it work in ways not envisioned by higher ups:

The USAAF didn’t want radial engines in their fighters, unlike the Navy, but found the P-47 more than useful, The USAAF built the B-17 to sink battleships which they couldn’t hit, but proved to be a great smasher of cities, factories, and lines of communication. The P-39 rear engine fighter was Zero bait, but the Soviets used it as a great ground attack fighter.

Both the M113 and the UH-1 started out as ambulances for the Medical Corps. The M-16 was rejected by the Army in favor of the M-14. Army Aviation insisted that helicopters should not be armed for air-to-air combat until the Hind showed up.

Of the elements of the FCS that is hyped as the wave of the future, the networked command and control system is not dependent on the task organization of troops in the field. Likewise, precision guided munitions isn’ t exactly new.

The highly touted UGS (unattended ground systems) were fielded in Vietnam and was responsible for effective targeting of the NVA in the siege of Khe Sanh, every move they made was telegraphed to targeting cells who unleashed waves of B-52’s. Chopper Pilots told me that they preferred to go over 2.000 feet to avoid the smell of death. I taught the use of UGS at Ft, Huachuca in early Seventies, and was dismayed that the testing at Ft Hood of the system couldn’t figure out how to use them and they were dropped from the Army inventory.

Go figure

Friday, December 28, 2007

A Cadre Defense

Against that day when the big balloon goes up, where the forward deployed forces have been shredded as have the grand plans from inside the magical Beltway, a backup military establishment with industry to match would be nice to have. The principal principle against that day is to follow Bedford Forrest’s dictum – “get thar fustest with the mostest!” – in short be able to muster the talent on hand, that which takes the longest lead time to develop, up and running rapidly.

The long lead time items include the larger capital ships like heavy cruisers, carriers, and Fancy Dan fighters. It includes investing in R&D, more pure than applied. And, most of all it means preserving the combat experience and military training of those who have served. Our current personnel policies are wasteful and wanting in this regard, tossing the trained to the wolves with disdainful regard, then when the fit hits the shan, searching the bottom of the barrel.

Long lead people are the noncoms, specialists, and officers with experience, of two to five or more years. It is in the initial four or five years of service that is the investment, the grounding and framework of the experienced fighter. In peacetime service, the majority of souls serve without being in the fleet or in the field, but in jobs tangentially related to core tasks, after their core service.

Since the most numerous of trooper is at the bottom, and the time to train up to entry level service is short range, a defense establishment prepared for the long haul, should focus on the skills, knowledge, and attitudes of the mid level enlisted and officer. One old training policy of days gone by, and also adopted by the German Army of between Great Wars was a skinny chain of command with lateral expansion of the command on paper, and with those serving at one level trained to operate at two levels higher. In this manner, the German Army could expand from a force of 100,000 to several millions of well led troops in short order.

The Germans and Soviets also instituted training in military skills in their youth groups like the Hitler Youth, Komsomol, and the Young Pioneers who trained the youth in political action, and, some military training, and skills needed for military operations. The Boy Scout movement was started by Lord Baden-Powell to maintain a skill base capable of skilled military use. The term “scout” is a military role requiring more than the average level of outdoorsy skills. Our CAP and Sea Cadets follow in this role, without the political clap trap.

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baden-Powell)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hitler_Youth)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Pioneers), (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komsomol)

The merit badge approach of short courses for veterans who wish only to keep their skills up to snuff, could be crafted to include marksmanship, paint ball competitions, military communications exercises, and a whole host of “fun” things to do to maintain a skill base, and to keep tabs on those we may need.

The military structure of forces not on active service should include, as today, units ready to rock and roll on the drop of the hat. This was the intent of the Capstone program which facilitated the fantastic rise in military competence of American Arms in peacetime ever. It had the down side of presenting the Congress with a fully capable military establishment at one third to one sixth the cost of an equivalent Active force.

Recent experience has proven that despite Pentagon assurances (and Federal Law) the Pentagon never really intended to call up trained units as such. From the start, given Defense Officers Management Act, the Pentagon as a replacement depot and to be kept in a separate pile from the Active service to facilitate post conflict reductions in force without resorting to RIF or the UP/Out promotion system. That provision of Law that required units to be called as such seems to have disappeared in a reshuffle of the law for administrative reasons, and needs to be reissued by the Congress.

It, however, must be recognized that under existing laws and plans, there is no systemic method of providing trained mid career personnel to replace losses and start new units except by cannibalization of existing units of all components. It is in the regard that a new division of labor between the components be drawn. Active forces must be geared to the most exigent of circumstances, particularly from foreign sources. The National Guard has a dual mission, of state and federal requirements. The Guard is the default national defense force for war, courtesy of the Second Amendment. And it has been the back bone of our national wars up through WW2.

The Reserves (USAR, USNR, USAFR, etc) were initially Federal Forces raised for the duration of a war. As such they were known as “US Volunteers” which included the famed “Rough Riders” After WW1, Reserve forces were developed to preserve certain skills and provide a pool of qualified individuals for service. After WW2, the Reserves were organized into field units such as Corps and Divisions, but after Vietnam, the structure was integrated into specific war scenarios called contingencies.

But these structures did not provide for replacements for extant units of any component. In this regard, the Reserves as opposed to the Guard have the capabilities to maintain replacements for any component. The only program in existence that met the criterion were non-pay mobilization units of those interested in keeping a hand in but generally consisted of lectures by individual members. The IRR, once considered a ready pool of replacements, proved to provide a third of those listed. Clearly, the need for small detachment and individual replacements for all components be made ready with such incentives in pay and challenge to keep those not in units.

The technology of the computer supported CPX can allow units without equipment to train in realistic environments with the clear expectation that they could be called as individuals or as the nexus of a whole new unit. A battalion consisting of a staff and part of a chain of command could be filled with entry level personnel and replacement from any component and made ready to deploy in short order.

What takes time in the development of a deployment ready unit is it’s chain of command, and not in the lowest level who consist of those who can be raised and trained in less than a year. It is time to re-institute cadre units.

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Full Mobilization - A Meritorious Approach

Once or twice a century, a nation has to fight for its life, where old men and boys are pressed into service to fight an invading force. Often the borders of the nation have been pierced and much of the homeland is occupied by the enemy. This is the scenario where at least ten percent of the total population is under arms and three or four times as many are in war industries. It is against this possibility that the base for this expansion must be laid in peacetime.

That which is more precious than gold, is the combat experience of previous wars as well as those with extensive training in the military arts. Traditional reserve structures have tried to maintain lists of those needed for the direst of emergencies, but in modern more mobile populations, the list becomes useless. Nevertheless those with experience exist. It is this population that mobilization planners must provide for with law and military order to gather the trained and experienced into the forces whether the individuals want to or not.

For the willing, traditional mobilization designee and unit training exist, but often many times the numbers so employed have no slots or choose the focus on their civilian careers. To encourage those without slots to fill, a new type of participation not dependent on slots but upon individual and collective training available without regard to career, but to preserve the skill base should be developed. Call it the “merit badge” approach, where sets of skills and a badge, or certificate is granted in recognition of completion. Such could be built around marksmanship, land navigation, telecommunications, command post duty, etc. Pay could be applied or not.

To provide for the mobilization of anyone who knows one end of a rifle from the other, the enlistment contract should be amended to provide for a life time commitment. Officers and retirees already have this stipulation. The government owns you until buried.

Mobilization planners should also develop mechanisms for the mobilization of segments of industry and commerce which have military applicability with minor military training needed. This is what happened in WW2 where hospitals and construction firms were brought into military service.

With a few exceptions, those organizations providing support for our troops overseas should be militarized and brought under the UCMJ. The form of their militarization would not necessarily be the career intensive model for the current military components, active or reserve, but designed for the duration. Raising these organizations could be under the initial administration of a state governor, or of a corporation, or the federal government itself. Once certified, the organization would be mustered into the services. The pay could be direct from the US government or through the original establishing organization as determined by the government.

This approach is not any different that which we used prior to WW1. Since the Pentagon has chosen to abandon the last one hundred years of military development, it is appropriate to take what worked before and up date it. It is also unlikely that the Pentagon could develop anything so threatening to their cookie jar, that it would be incumbent on the Congress to do so, as that is their specified power given in the Constitution. And that brings it back to whoever is reading this tome.

Sunday, December 23, 2007

Concurrent and Networked Training - a cure for Transformation

The return of the Training Cycle approach to training makes simplistic visual sense, as if the skills of each successive level of command from individual to Theatre were dependant upon the levels below. They are not. Each successive level of command consists of squad’s networks laterally with other squads of the same headquarters, and with other squads representing the chain of command, adjacent, and supporting commands.

The chatter between these networked squads is analogous to the flow of electrical charges through a nervous system, the nervous system that ties the eyes, ears, legs, stomach, heart, stomach and brain of an individual. The training cycle approach starts with the feet. BTMS, the Battalion Training Management System, stressed concurrent training using the whole body, but in successively more difficult and complex tasks.

The replication of the chatter between squads is the sum and substance of the command post exercise (CPX). A well designed CPX is hard to distinguish from actual operations if that chatter is presented in the form and through the proper medium to the squads representing the exercised unit including the fog of war.

The Field Training Exercise is where the squads interface with the mud, dust, rain and (simulated) blood of warfare. In the field, they still are linked with other squads at platoon, company, battalion as well as the fire support system, supply system, and the other vertical and horizontal networks of the whole organization. The link between the squad is the radio.

Training the squad in isolation from the even the simulation of the chatter is what we used to do in the Auld Days prior to Vietnam. Rifle squads were trained in isolation from the platoon until platoon training started. Back then the legacy of the Korean War was hill-centric. Each successive levels of training were oriented around finding squad sized hills, platoon sized hills, on up to battalion and brigade sized hills. Each level used the same maneuver; base of fire pinned down the presumed enemy always on the top of the hill, while the maneuver element hit the hill from the flank.

Unbeknownst to us, the Soviets built fire traps on the flanks of their forward elements to cut up our maneuver elements.

For the last twenty or so years, innovative training has married the CPX to the FTX by using a unit going through an exercise to be linked to an ongoing CPX. This is happening at Ft Hunter Ligget in combat training of support units, and was used in a previous lifetime in large scale logistics exercises that I participated in as a member of the 75th Division then known at “The MAC’. I worked in an intelligence capacity in division, corps, corps support command, area support command, and networked medical and MP units for instance. These large exercises involved joint and combined operations with participants from other services and other nations.

The downside of these large exercises is that the RC chain of command understood more of the nuts and bolts of large unit operations than the AC chain of command as the latter were focused on Brigade and below operations done in a vacuum. The chatter between elements of combat units in contact tends to be more vertically aligned with successive levels of command. The operations orders of next higher are the prime source of information. In the FTX mode, chatter with support units such as field artillery is often ignored to the detriment of the grunt on the ground later in actual combat without fire support, beans, bullets, gas and maintenance support.

The chatter in Combat Service Support and Combat Support (CSS and CS) tends to be networked in all directions. The intelligence requirements for an intelligence unit come as much from supported and lateral “squads” as from on high. Some support is organized as a vertically oriented structure as are the delivery of gas and ammo and the evacuation of the wounded. Some are service oriented on both an area and command basis as are medical and engineer units. The exact composition of a support element depends on the mix of needs of the supported commands which result in an ad hoc mix of vertically or horizontally integrated networks unified by a common doctrine and training.

The dark side of the Abrams Doctrine was that he intended to ensure that the RC was included in the next war by shifting the logistics to them. This, however, had a serious unintended side effect. The AC forgot logistics until operations in the Balkans brought to their attention that they couldn’t rely on the Log Fairies Four (the Gas Fairy, the Truck Fairy, the Ammo Fairy, and the Fixit Fairy) in the RW as they had in their training exercises. They were devastated that the detested Weekend Warrior, the Wannabe Warrior, would actually show up in uniform wearing leaves and eagles.

Then came the end of the large scale RC CPX, the Modularization of the Army, and the substitution of military CSS and CS units with Halliburton, Custer Battles, and Blackwater. While Modularization is sold as a simpler structure, it actually creates a more complex, tricky, and uncoordinated ad hoc approach to supporting the troops than the well trained and experienced RC CSS and CS command structure.

The 75th had to develop an interim Rear Area Operations doctrine in order to train CS and CSS units. This guidance was published in an annual document to support training as
Appendix J to that document. As it was the only guidance around after Vietnam was swept under the rug, it gained some credence to the point that a copy was republished by the Command and General Staff College with their logo and the title “Appendix J – Rear Area Combat Operations” also known as RACO.

We are still losing people in Iraq and Afghanistan to attacks on our lines of communication which attacks were principal tool we used to alter the flow of chatter in a logistic organization to cause them to exercise the military decision making process to meet changes in supply and demand for their services. Our clients included not only the logistics units, but included the Engineers, Military Police, and Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC) that coordinated and protected the rear. These are the units that Rumsfeld left behind. The rest is recent history.

As an aside, the 75th also used Soviet Airborne divisions as a tool to alter the relation of supply and demand for logistics in a number of scenarios set in the Fulda and North German plains scenarios. I picked out landing zones and objectives on the Rhine and on critical terrain between the Rhine and Antwerp. Some AC colonel ridiculed our scenario, saying it was unrealistic.

I recently found out from the German Consul General that during the reunification of Germany, he was liaison to the departing Soviets and the East German military, he found out that the Soviets were going to use ten airborne divisions and on the same sites I had chosen.

Unfortunately, my bragging is no consolation for a conflict that would have ended already had the Army Reserve and National Guard had been deployed as trained and organized/

Saturday, December 22, 2007

Dumbing Down the Force - Rotational Training

Once discredited, the rotational training cycle has returned as a part of preparing troops for war. It was discredited after Vietnam as it was found that concurrent training at multiple levels under what was called Systems Engineer Performance Oriented Training, later dubbed BTMS (Battalion Training Management System) was far more effective and efficient. At the core of the systems engineering part was the break down of what needed to be done on the battlefield into Tasks with attendant Conditions and Standards. This was aggregated into a hierarchy of tasks, called Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) for the entire chain of command.

The analysis of the performance orientation aspect of training quickly came to the conclusion that concurrent training of all levels was more efficient and effective. Under BTMS, the Army’s level of competence rose faster than in any period since the Revolution. Until Vietnam, the collective competence of an Army could go to practically ineffective in less than five years. Task Force Smith of Korean War ignominy, where troops from Occupied Japan were clobbered by North Korean troops raised and trained after WW2.

This did not happen after Vietnam. The Army reassessed itself and rebuilt itself. The Reserve Components did likewise and in my opinion (based on experience with the 75th in large unit exercises) they were better trained at all levels than the troops that I had served with in Germany and in Vietnam.

Key to this revival was concurrent training which turned the training of individuals over to the NCO, and of the unit to the leadership. This, coupled with NCOES professional training for the NCO empowered the whole chain of command which had been serious weakening in the Fifties and Pre-War Sixties by officers doing the work of sergeants, and sergeants being over paid privates.

BTMS had two fatal flaws. It cut out the Colonels and the staffniks at levels above battalion. And in the words of the ruff and ready, no combat ready unit ever passed an paperwork inspection, nor a paper ready unit ever pass combat. DTMS was difficult to paper over as it was too complex and irrelevant for combat ready units to mess with.

Power abhors a vacuum and into the breach charged the Staffniks with Mandatory Training Requirements, and consolidated training under staff control. Staff control of unit activities is gratifying to the frustrated staffnik who wants the fun of command without the responsibilities. Any successes go to staff and the blame to command. This isn’t peculiar to the Army or to the military in particular as many a corporate employee can attest.

Once the Pentagon realized, as had many of the Two Star Crowd in the Field, that RC units were more than “up to snuff” but better than AC units, the panic button was pushed. After years of raising the performance bar for RC units, hoping they would trip and stumble, until the bar was raised above the standards for AC units, the Pentagon had to act decisively. They scrapped the mobilization plans based on METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available and Time) to one based solely on the Time and Troops Available, ignoring Mission, Enemy and Terrain.

Included in this “Transformation”, is the Return of the Training Cycle. It makes a sort of crude simplicity and clarity of definition with successive levels of command being trained in succession as if one level was dependent on lower levels for competence at each level. While this may make sense for an individual destined for a command slot, it is counter productive for a collection of individuals who have to operate with other collections of individuals. A rifle squad operates in conjunction with an artillery gun crew through the fire direction system which involves several staffs in between.

The Training Cycle that I was experienced in prior to Vietnam was on an annual basis, not the five year basis under Transformation. In Germany the culmination of the Training Cycle was when the ground froze and we could conduct large scale maneuvers, up to division on division. The Cycle restarted after the thaw and individual training resumed. Given the destructive effect of the Duty Roster on training, the only real training we got was when the harvest was in and we could maneuver through “Comrade’s” farm yards. Individual and Squad training was ineffective.

Early in my career, whilst I was a young sergeant in the 63rd Division USAR at Camp Roberts, my Company Commander, one Otto Atkinson, took our company to the field the Sunday we arrived and returned the following Friday night. In the field we dug in, wired, and “mined” the area and conducted training 24/6. Later, in the 3rd Armored Division (Spearhead) in Germany, one battalion commander (Don Starry) showed the Division Commander the amount of time lost in garrison and convinced him that the Division should move to the field while at Hohenfels. Our training time tripled and administrative time virtually disappeared.

Later, as Battalion Commander of the 304th MI Bn (USAR) I took my battalion to Ft Hood to participate in Operation Starburst which was the 49th Armored Division (TXARNG) which was fully deployed, guns and all. It was a target rich environment for our direction finding, traffic analysis, counter intelligence and command capabilities.
It was a vicious fight to get my battalion free of staffnik control as, but under the rules of the road at the time, I had the responsibility for the training, not them.

The most valuable lesson learned was the complexity of interface with other units for support and to support. This was extremely difficult to simulate in training particularly since few knew of those relationships not having exercised them in reality, virtual or actual.

In short, concurrent training of a chain of command in environments replicating those of combat deployment 24/7 year round is the optimum training environment. Simulation, even sustained simulation using a continuous scenario, is proving to be an effective tool to cut the costs of full up 24/7.

Imagine an RC unit reporting in for their battle drill weekend, and walk into a war in progress in a mix of simulation and field work as if checking in from a previous day. The actual size of the unit involved could be as small as a squad or as large as a full division.

Based on the observations of over forty years, I find that the training cycle approach is the most efficient system to dumb down a force. And with five year cycle, unit commanders who have to go to war with their unit may have never commanded it.

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

The Gates Paradigm, Full Spectrum Warfare

The development of Full Spectrum Warfare coming out soon in a new Field Manual is the greatest shift in American military theory in the last one hundred years. Sometimes called “4GW” or Fourth Generation Warfare, it is the recognition that winning a war is more than battlefield victory, that losing the Peace forfeits the fruits of battles won.

FM 3-24, the manual on Counterinsurgency that came out of Ft Leavenworth a year ago, and now producing measurable gains in Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) focuses on a multi-disciplinary multi-level effort to enable the Iraqi people to take charge of their own affairs un-cowed by the savage and barbarous. It is a recognition that running water, garbage removal, light and power, effective governance and a working economy are the job of all ranks from the Strategic Sergeant to the most senior in the services.

FM 3-24 introduces the concepts of Full Spectrum Warfare in this recognition which I noted before and goes beyond just Counterinsurgency. It goes right to the heart of winning the peace in any war.

http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/military-review-mr-on-counter.html

Likewise, Full Spectrum Warfare recognizes that several forms of battle may exist side by side, and often intermingled, “near peer” war mixed with expeditionary war mixed with the now famous “Three Block War”.

Defense Secretary Gates is implementing the concepts inherent in Full Spectrum Warfare in the quiet efficient and effective manner without the bombast of previous occupants of the Puzzle Palace. His senior military assistant, LTG Peter W Chiarelli is a a strong advocate of the new paradigm in war as noted in his article in Military Review, September-October issue, “Learning from our Modern Wars: Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future”.

The development of AFRICOM, the new Joint Command for working in Africa recognizes the necessity of working with all other actors in Theater, once a cardinal principle in what was called “Stability Operations” when I took the Armored Officers Advanced Course (AOAC) back when the Vietnam War was still hot.

Secretary Gates in his article, “How to Meet Our Nation's Challenges,” from the Landon Lecture Series, 27 November 2007, goes beyond just the military, calling for an larger Foreign Service in the State Department, and unusual move for a Secretary of Defense, but recognizes that the US must have one foreign policy, not dueling dialogues from such as Powell vs Von Rumsfeld, and that such coordination of one policy must go down to the Three Block War.

This vertical and horizontal integration is new to doctrine, but not new to practice. It was done right in the Post WW2 environment in Germany, Japan, and Austria. That Austria became neutral and not absorbed into the Iron Curtain when the West signed off on Austria’s Peace Treaty is proof of the effectiveness of the approach and a serious disappointment to Stalin.

Part of the reason why that occupation went well is perhaps due to the fact that the military has a disproportionate representation of Southern Officers, and in the Deep South, Reconstruction still burns deep. It still does. Reconstruction after the Civil War is a classic case of how not to do post war winning the peace. If the Civil War was fought over emancipating the Blacks, that didn’t occur for another one hundred years after the War. And it’s not over.

Other references:http://www.rand.org/pubs/annual_reports/2006/RAND_AR7110.pdf


http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/CorrelatesofPostmodernWarfare.pdf